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Article
Redundancy and Anti-Redundancy in Copyright
OREN BRACHA & JOHN M. GOLDEN
United States copyright law has a reputation as a tangled mess of overlapping
legal doctrines. Although commonly maligned, this redundancy can play a positive
role. Redundancy that is well-designed and implemented can achieve a better
balance between copyright law’s benefits and costs, safeguard interests in
competition and technological innovation, improve protection of freedom of speech,
and enable flexibility and doctrinal evolution. On the other hand, doctrinal
redundancy can have unfortunate results when it is excessive or otherwise
unmoored from underlying purpose. Design principles of redundancy and antiredundancy are thus virtually tailor-made to analyze copyright law’s structure in
search of identifying potential justifications, flaws, and opportunities for reform.
Building on prior work on legal redundancy and on copyright doctrine, this Article
examines the promise and risks of doctrinal redundancy as a design principle for
copyright. Specifically, the Article analyzes redundancy in four areas of copyright
doctrine: (1) fair use and non-functionality; (2) fair use and improper
appropriation; (3) copyrightable subject matter and originality; and (4) the
reproduction and derivative-work rights. The analysis indicates that distinct but
overlapping doctrines of fair use, originality, and copyrightable subject matter can
better police the boundaries of an expansive copyright regime than could a single
doctrine alone. Such reinforced policing is particularly important to secure interests
in free speech and competition against improper copyright encroachment. In
contrast, however, there is reason to question the social value of redundancy as
embodied in distinctly identified rights in making reproductions and derivative
works. More generally, our analysis illustrates how attention to the structural
design of legal doctrine can help to improve the content and operation of law.
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Redundancy and Anti-Redundancy in Copyright
OREN BRACHA * & JOHN M. GOLDEN **
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have brought new rounds of agitation for substantial
copyright reform.1 True reform entails considering a legal field’s central
doctrines and working to shape them to best serve their underlying purposes.
But reform should commonly do more than consider individual doctrines as
separate parts. Like other legal fields, copyright law is a system of legal
norms. By “a system” we mean a group of connected norms that mutually
interact and affect the results produced by the connected whole.
Understanding this systemic dimension goes to the heart of proper
evaluation and design of copyright as a legal field. Law is a purposive
practice: its norms and procedures are designed to further certain ends.2
Thus, the way that the interaction between different legal norms affect the
achievement of underlying purposes is central for the proper design of legal
fields.
A rough analogy can be made to problems in systems engineering.3 A
good engineer designing a vehicle does not restrict her attention to perfecting
each of its elements in isolation. She would also want to know how the
*
William C. Conner Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. For helpful comments, the
authors thank David Adelman, Sam Bray, Chris Buccafusco, Janet Freilich, Wendy Gordon, Geoffrey
Manne, Peter Menell, Pamela Samuelson, Talha Syed, and participants in a Drawing Board workshop at
the University of Texas School of Law, the 2017 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, the 2018
Fordham IP Conference, and the 2018 Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional and
Organizational Economics.
**
Loomer Family Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740, 740 (2013)
(detailing the findings of the The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform that recommended
twenty-five reforms for U.S. copyright law); Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 315 (2013) (addressing the need for comprehensive review and revision of
U.S. copyright law); David S. Levine, Ten Challenges in Technology and Intellectual Property Law for
2015: Remarks at the Wake Forest Journal of Business and Intellectual Property Law Symposium, 15
WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 563, 565 (2015) (discussing work by the American Law
Institute on a copyright restatement).
2
See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 166 (tent. ed. 1958)
(describing law as “a purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve . . . basic problems of social
living”); W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1333, 1357-58 (2009) (“The most basic constraint on what counts as a plausible interpretation of
law is that law must be viewed as a purposive activity, as having some point or end.”).
3
Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 11 (1940) (speaking of “the field of purposive
human activity, which includes both steam engines and the law”).
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elements interact and affect each other’s function. If the brake system
impedes the performance of the otherwise highly effective steering
mechanism, this is a pertinent design consideration. Likewise, the engineer
will take notice if the combination of two subsystems creates a highly
beneficial synergetic effect. If, for some reason, the design of the brake
system means that the same desired effectiveness in steering can be achieved
with a more streamlined steering mechanism, the engineer might exploit this
synergy and use the streamlining to improve another aspect of vehicle
performance, such as fuel efficiency.
What can a focus on copyright’s systematic aspect teach us? U.S.
copyright law has a reputation of being a tangled mess.4 Much of this
reputation is due to overlapping and sometimes conflicting legal doctrines.5
Associated redundancies are commonly maligned, but questions of how
much overlap or even internal conflict a legal field’s doctrines should feature
are more helpfully conceived as questions about appropriate, if not optimal,
system design.6 Redundancy in the structure of legal doctrine can serve
positive purposes, such as ensuring effective protection of core interests,
providing fail-safes, or enabling flexibility and doctrinal evolution on lessreinforced margins.7 Of course, not all redundancy is beneficial. Doctrinal
redundancy can be wasteful, overly cumbersome for legal decision-makers,
or simply confusing.8 As a result, one can view redundancy and antiredundancy as competing design principles whose pluses and minuses
should be balanced in light of a legal field’s underlying purposes. With its
array of overlapping doctrines and need to avoid improper encroachment on
interests in free speech9 and free competition,10 copyright law is virtually
tailor-made for such an analysis. This Article focuses on redundancy and
anti-redundancy in examining copyright law as a system of norms.
4
See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
673, 679 (2003) (“The copyright system is broken.”); cf. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as
Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1813 (2007) (arguing that even
in its most controversial form, copyright law features a “detailed governance regime of fine-tuned
balancing between access and use.”).
5
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 417, 453 (2016) (discussing how courts have invoked copyright doctrines that overlap
with merger rulings).
6
John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 646–47 (2016).
7
See id. at 658–66.
8
Id. at 671, 673, 705.
9
See Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and its Legal Milieu, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 30 (2006) (“The scheme of copyright law responds to both free speech concerns
and competitive concerns by limiting propertization to expression (excluding ideas, facts,
functionalities), by having a limited term, by limiting coverage to copying and to distribution of objects
that are copies, and by retaining the defense of fair use[.]”).
10
See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989) (“Taken together, the novelty
and nonobviousness requirements express a congressional determination that the purposes behind the
Patent Clause are best served by free competition and exploitation of either that which is already available
to the public or that which may be readily discerned from publicly available material.”).
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In Part I, we provide a brief overview of the nature of doctrinal
redundancy and anti-redundancy as well as their advantages and
disadvantages. In Part II, we analyze, in light of this theoretical background,
various instances of apparent and actual redundancy in copyright law. We
argue that such an analysis suggests ways in which the law can be
understood, applied, or altered to better serve its social aims. Specifically,
we examine four areas of doctrinal overlap: (1) the rule denying copyright
protection to functional subject matter and the rule exempting “fair uses”
from copyright liability; (2) the improper appropriation requirement and the
same fair use doctrine; (3) statutory categories of copyrightable subject
matter and the originality requirement; and (4) the intersection of the
reproduction and derivative-work rights. We conclude by distilling from
these central cases of copyright redundancy what we posit to be general
lessons for redundancy and anti-redundancy in legal design.
In multiple cases, we find that what initially might appear to be simply
wasteful or superfluous doctrinal repetition is actually—if understood and
applied properly—sound legal design that advances important goals,
including the protection of core interests in free speech and competition.
Indeed, we argue that in some cases, scholarly calls and overt or implied
moves by courts to eliminate doctrinal redundancy should be reconsidered.
Our outlook, however, is not Panglossian. In one of our cases, we find that
a common failure to properly understand the substantive relationship
between the two intersecting doctrines has led to confusion and odd results.
Moreover, even in the cases where redundancy may have a positive role to
play, this is contingent on applying the relevant doctrines with a proper
understanding of their interaction and their underlying purpose. In short, we
find that copyright law provides both fertile ground for the application of
redundancy principles and an enlightening laboratory for understanding
them better.
I. REDUNDANCY AND ANTI-REDUNDANCY OVERVIEW
A. Forms of Redundancy
Legal redundancy can appear in procedural, institutional, textual, and
doctrinal forms. This Article concerns doctrinal redundancy, which is a form
of legal redundancy that occurs when two or more legal doctrines have
“overlapping and reinforcing coverage.”11 The reinforcing nature of this
coverage means that, at least in some circumstances, the doctrines use
substantially shared facts and concerns to generate shared outcomes that
each individual doctrine could suffice to generate by itself.12 For example,
11
12

Golden, supra note 6, at 636.
Id.
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in contract law, the duty of good faith and fair dealing in contract
performance,13 the pre-existing duty rule,14 and doctrines of duress15 and
unconscionability16 are redundant in the sense that each can act as
independent grounds for finding unenforceable a contract modification
extracted unfairly and without new consideration.17
Importantly, doctrinal redundancy need not be complete. Legal
doctrines can be partially redundant in the sense that their areas of coverage,
use of facts, or outputs only partially coincide.18 Accordingly, the duty of
good faith and fair dealing and doctrines of duress and unconscionability can
have an operative effect in situations in which there is no pre-existing duty,
and the pre-existing duty rule—however controversially—can prevent
enforcement of promises in situations in which there is no bad faith,
improper threat justifying a finding of duress or unconscionable conduct.19
Indeed, partial redundancy is likely to be much more common and,
policy-wise, more interesting than complete redundancy. When two legal
doctrines are recognizably equivalent in all respects, their application, if not
their very existence, will likely collapse into a single, unified analysis or a
trivially wasteful and purely repetitive one. For example, in 2006, the U.S.
Supreme Court enabled both of these potential effects by adopting a fourpronged test for permanent injunctions with two prongs—(1) a requirement
for irreparable injury and (2) a requirement for inadequacy of legal

13
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”).
14
See id. § 73 (“Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the
subject of honest dispute is not consideration.”); cf. id. § 89 (“A promise modifying a duty under a
contract not fully performed on either side is binding (a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view
of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made.”).
15
See id. § 175(1) (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the
other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”).
16
See id. § 208 (“If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made[,]
a court may refuse to enforce the contract.”).
17
Cf. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.22, at 272–73 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that the
Uniform Commercial Code’s requirement of good faith and fair dealing imposes “the same standard as
that suggested earlier under the liberalized rules on duress” and that “[t]his expanded concept of duress
would make promises voidable in precisely those situations in which the pre-existing duty rule can be
justified”).
18
Golden, supra note 6, at 637–41. Further, there can be a phenomenon of probabilistic partial
redundancy in accordance with which (1) it might be unclear whether two separately articulated legal
doctrines are completely or only partially redundant and (2) this relationship might change as
understandings of the doctrines and their contexts evolve. Id. at 641.
19
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 4.21, at 270 (observing that the pre-existing duty rule “does
not . . . distinguish between the situation in which the contractor’s demand for more money is motivated
merely by opportunism and greed and the situation in which the demand is prompted by discovery of
circumstances or the occurrence of events that makes the contractor’s performance much more
burdensome”).
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remedies—that appear properly understood to be “one and the same.”20
Unsurprisingly, trial courts have generally found that these two prongs rise
or fall together,21 and it is unclear that their separation accomplishes much
in one direction or another.
In contrast, partial redundancy can be more interesting in the sense that
it more likely offers not only substantial benefits but also substantial costs.
Costs tend to be greater than for complete redundancy because courts or
other decision-makers must engage in somewhat differential analysis of each
of two only partially redundant doctrines. On the other hand, benefits can
also be greater because the lack of complete redundancy can mean that
performance of a second, distinct analysis involving similar facts or
concerns is more likely to add significant value than a second, completely
redundant analysis would.22 In short, whereas complete redundancy between
legal doctrines is commonly trivial in the sense of being substantially
pointless and largely inconsequential, partial redundancy can frequently
accomplish much, but details and context will determine whether, on net,
what is accomplished is for good or ill.
B. Arguments for Redundancy and Anti-Redundancy
This Section recounts some of the major benefits and costs that can be
associated with partial redundancy. These benefits and costs can be grouped
in three basic areas: (1) effects of redundancy on the occurrence of legal
“error,” which we take to mean a legal outcome that is socially undesirable;
(2) redundancy’s association with efficiency in the development or
administration of the law; and (3) positive or negative implications of
redundancy for the flexibility and evolutionary potential of legal doctrine.
On the positive side, redundancy can add value even with respect to the
efficiency of lawmaking and law application, despite common
characterizations to the contrary. More specifically, when getting the “right”
answer on any one of multiple partially redundant doctrines will lead to the
“right” social outcome, redundancy can generate error-avoidance gains by
increasing the probability that a court or other decisionmaker will arrive at
the “right” result. Redundancy can be especially important in this regard
when the primary social interest at stake has substantial priority over others,
or when there is ambiguity or another significant source of error in applying

20
Golden, supra note 6, at 638–39 (quoting Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 209 (2012)).
21
See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical
Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1994 (2016) (finding that, in patent cases, trial courts came to the same
conclusions on irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies in 176 of 178 cases).
22
Section I.B discusses reasons why partial redundancy can have such an advantage relative to
complete redundancy.
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23

one or more of the partially redundant doctrines.
In relation to law development or administration, redundancy can be
associated with greater efficiency in at least two sets of circumstances. The
first set of circumstances involves situations in which it is easier to develop
a set of partially redundant legal doctrines to protect an identified set of
interests than to develop a more streamlined or non-overlapping set of
doctrines to achieve the same ends. The second set of circumstances
involves situations in which deployment of a set of partially redundant
doctrines makes a larger number of cases either easy to resolve or resolvable
substantially earlier.24 Such earlier or easier resolution can occur because,
under certain circumstances, one doctrine or another facilitates resolution of
a legal dispute at an earlier stage than would be allowed by the others or
because, even at a single decision point, a decisionmaker can prioritize
application of the doctrine that offers the simplest path to a decisive legal
conclusion.25
Finally, redundancy can generate evolutionary and flexibility gains
when a combination of different but partially redundant doctrines offers
distinct opportunities for growth and adaptation of the law.26 Such
opportunities can reflect either the fact that one doctrine’s securing of core
legal interests makes more tolerable the relative fluidity of another doctrine,
or the fact that each doctrine contributes its own “possibility frontier”—its
own margins of ambiguity or uncertainty—along which courts or other legal
decision-makers can effectively develop previously unsettled law.27
As noted above, however, redundancy can have disadvantages along all
of these dimensions as well. Under appropriate circumstances, these
disadvantages justify the anti-redundancy rhetoric often featured in both
policy debates and judicial decision-making.28 To a substantial extent, the
potential disadvantages of redundancy mirror its potential benefits. First,
redundancy can lead to increased errors when partially redundant doctrines
23
For a discussion of how the partial redundancy of improper appropriation and fair use helps
safeguard free speech interests, see infra notes 200–208 and accompanying text.
24
For a discussion of improper appropriation as superior to fair use for early resolution of an
important subset of cases, see infra notes 177–97 and accompanying text.
25
With a different conceptual framework of “hierarchy and speciali[z]ation,” Henry Smith suggests
similar advantages of retaining equity as a backstop to law, with law commonly featuring “simpler, more
general and easier to follow” rules while “equity saves law from bad results in extreme situations.” Henry
E. Smith, Equitable Defences as Meta-Law, in DEFENCES IN EQUITY 17, 25 (Paul S. Davies et al. eds.,
2018).
26
For a discussion of how fair use can offer a safety net for adaptation of the law to new
technological and economic developments, backing up the core function of the rule excluding protection
for functional subject matter, see infra notes 132–36 and accompanying text.
27
Golden, supra note 6, at 704–07.
28
See id. at 631 (“Judges frequently cite anti-redundancy principles in interpreting legal documents,
opining on the structure of legal doctrine or objecting to ‘relitigation’ of issues under ostensibly different
legal headings.”).
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erect successive barriers to achievement of a “right” outcome or when
redundancy generates error-producing confusion about the proper meaning
of partially redundant doctrines.29 Second, redundancy can increase the costs
of law development or administration by straining attention or demanding
greater attention to navigate, without error, the sometimes subtle or even
obscure distinctions between doctrines that can be associated with partial
redundancy.30 Moreover, redundancy can sometimes diffuse developmental
efforts across a swath of legal doctrines, thereby preventing a potentially
more efficient focus of legal decisionmakers’ attention on a smaller set of
well-traveled doctrinal channels.31 Third, redundancy can generate
evolutionary and flexibility losses, for example, by entrenching a set of legal
outcomes that turn out to be increasingly undesirable with time.32
In short, depending on the circumstances, redundancy can be a design
feature or a design flaw. When smartly deployed, redundancy can add much
value, but poorly designed or administered redundancy can yield the various
ills highlighted by anti-redundancy rhetoric. Part II will explore how
doctrinal redundancy plays out in a number of prominent circumstances in
copyright law.
Before proceeding with Part II’s contextual analysis, however, we
should note that one hurdle to proper analysis of the pluses and minuses of
redundancy can come from the mis-categorization of various situations as
involving complete redundancy or no redundancy whatsoever. Spurious
assertions of redundancy perhaps most often come in the form of allegations
of complete redundancy when there is, in fact, only partial redundancy.33 A
classic textual example is the statement “war is war,” which had more than
tautological meaning when penned by General Sherman during the month
that his troops took Atlanta.34 The contrapositive phenomenon is a denial of
even partial redundancy when there is a lack of complete redundancy.35 The
29
Id. at 704–05. For a discussion of evidence of judicial confusion about the relationship between
the partially redundant rights of reproduction and of preparing derivative works, see infra text
accompanying notes 301–93.
30
See Golden, supra note 6, at 668, 705 (explaining that “avoiding redundancy can be costly as
well, perhaps particularly at the stage of generating and designing legal documents, doctrines, processes,
or institutions”).
31
See id. at 672–73 (discussing the inverse in how anti-redundancy could “foster greater
predictability and perhaps even accuracy in legal judgments”).
32
See id. at 706–07 (explaining redundancy’s evolutionary value).
33
See id. at 644 (defining spurious redundancy and explaining that often, complete redundancy is
only partial).
34
See id. (invoking the example of “War is war” as a “classically redundant statement” (citing 2
WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, MEMOIRS OF GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN 111 (1875) (quoting the end of a
letter to General Halleck, which said, “If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will
answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking”))).
35
The statement in the text follows from the fact that “if not complete redundancy, then not partial
redundancy” is the contrapositive of “if partial redundancy, then complete redundancy.” See DANIEL
SOLOW, HOW TO READ AND DO PROOFS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL THOUGHT PROCESS 30
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fact that appellate judicial review is generally distinct from trial proceedings
and commonly accepted as well-justified does not mean that aspects of that
review are not at least partially redundant with the work of the trial court.36
In general, partial redundancy as we define it is likely to be much more
prevalent than acknowledged by many discussions of redundancy. It is
crucial to our perspective that redundancy be understood as a potentially
multi-dimensional phenomenon—generally a question of degree, rather than
a binary question of zero or one.
II. DOCTORAL REDUNDANCY IN COPYRIGHT
Copyright law is rich in partial redundancy. More specifically, copyright
law features multiple sets of doctrines that address the same or overlapping
concerns in various circumstances or otherwise perform overlapping
functions. This Article explores four such sets: (1) the fair use doctrine and
the separately articulated prohibition of copyrighting functionality; (2) the
fair use doctrine and separately articulated limitations on what is considered
improper appropriation copying; (3) limitations on copyrightable subject
matter and copyright’s requirement of originality; and (4) copyright’s
exclusive rights of reproduction and of making derivative works.
A. Fair Use and Functionality
Let us start by exploring the relationship between the rule that denies
copyright protection to functional subject matter and the fair use doctrine,
which excepts certain uses of copyrighted material from liability. The former
rule is usually traced back to the 1879 decision, Baker v. Selden, in which
the Supreme Court refused to extend copyright protection to a chart
necessary for the use of a new accounting method.37 The decision stands for
two main propositions.
The first proposition indicated by Baker is the perhaps common sense
one that copyright protection cannot extend to functional or utilitarian
subject matter.38 The Court’s example in Baker was a book describing the
design of a machine.39 While the expression in the book is entitled to
protection as a literary work, the mechanical design it describes is not
(1982) (observing that “NOT B implies NOT A” is the contrapositive of “A implies B” and that “the
statement “NOT B implies NOT A” is true under the same conditions as “A implies B” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
36
See id. at 640–41 (illustrating partial redundancy through the example of trial and appellate
courts).
37
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879).
38
Id. at 102; see Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L.
REV. 1293, 1319 (2017) (describing Baker as being based on the principle that functional elements of
expressive works do not receive protection).
39
Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.
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copyrightable subject matter. If at all, the mechanical design may receive
patent protection, subject to meeting the various substantive and procedural
patentability requirements. Thus, one who copies the book may infringe
upon its copyright, but one who reproduces the mechanical design described
in the book does not.
The second Baker proposition, the so-called merger doctrine, raises the
stakes.41 It instructs that, when expressive subject matter and functional
subject matter are entwined, copyright protection must be denied to any
expressive elements that are also part of, and hence for doctrinal purposes
“merged” with, the relevant function.42 In Baker, for example, the disputed
chart consisted of a combination of text and graphic elements that ordinarily
would be classic copyrightable expression.43 But if a person wanted to use
the new accounting system, she would apparently have had to use Selden’s
chart or something very similar to it.44 In this sense, the expressive chart was
the functional method or part thereof. Under such circumstances, the merger
doctrine insists that no copyright protection subsists in the merged
expressive elements.45 One way of restating this principle is that, when
expressive and functional elements are merged, the non-copyrightability of
function preempts copyright protection for expression.
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976 codifies Baker v. Selden’s
40

Id.
See id. at 103 (“[W]here the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and
diagrams used to illustrate the book . . . such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary
incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public . . . for the purpose of practical application.”). The
merger doctrine was clearly distinguished and acquired its name only in much later cases. See, e.g., Apple
Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252–53 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing the
idea/expression dichotomy); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1967)
(“Copyright attaches to form of expression.”); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 31–32, 36
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (observing that “copyrightability might be altogether denied” when “an author’s
monopoly threatens to infringe unduly on public use of the ideas or objects of [the author’s] expression”);
see also Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between
Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159, 189–90 (Jane C. Ginsburg &
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (chronicling the development of “idea/expression merger
doctrine” and explaining that, although it is “sometimes attributed to Baker,” it really “did not begin to
emerge until the late 1950’s and did not reach its apogee until 1983,” when the Third Circuit decided
Apple Computer).
42
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 535 (6th Cir. 2004)
(observing that when expression and ideas or functional subject matter merge “copyright protection does
not exist because granting protection to the expressive component of the work necessarily would extend
protection to the work’s uncopyrightable” elements).
43
See Baker, 101 U.S. at 100 (noting that that “[t]he book or series of books” in question included
“certain forms or blanks, consisting of ruled lines, and headings”).
44
See id. at 101 (“It is contended that [the complainant] has secured [an] exclusive right [to a
bookkeeping system], because no one can use the system without using substantially the same ruled lines
and headings which he has appended to his books in illustration of it.”).
45
See id. at 104 (observing that, because the bookkeeping system at issue “was not patented,” it
was “open and free to the use of the public,” “[a]nd, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines and
headings of accounts must necessarily be used as incident to it”).
41
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exclusion of functional subject matter. This is a loose codification,
however. Section 102(b) simply lists “procedure[s], process[es], system[s],
[and] method[s] of operation” as among the kinds of subject matter to which
copyright protection does not extend.47 This formulation is broadly
understood as incorporating preexisting case law, including the merger
doctrine, on the exclusion of functional matter from copyright, but also as
leaving much room for the courts to develop the exclusion in new contexts.48
The fair use doctrine, loosely codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act, is
currently the most important mechanism for restricting copyright’s
coverage. 49 Section 107 defines behavior which otherwise violates the
owner’s exclusive rights as “not an infringement of copyright” if found to
be fair use.50 The section lists several examples of purposes of using
copyrighted works that may make the use fair,51 but the construal of these
examples as merely illustrative has greatly diminished their importance.52
Section 107 also directs courts to consider four statutory factors: “(1) the
purpose and character of the use . . . ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used . . . ; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market . . . .”53 The American fair use doctrine,
often contrasted with its British fair dealing cousin, is famously openended.54 In prescribing a broad standard accompanied by four factors,
themselves fashioned as capacious standards, the doctrine contemplates the
courts as the senior partner in fashioning the exact content of the doctrine
and applying it to new contexts.55
To understand the intersection between § 102(b) and fair use, consider
Oracle v. Google.56 In this complex case, Oracle asserted copyright
46

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §102(b) (2012).
Id.
48
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 (stating
that the purpose of § 102(b) is to “restate, in the context of the new single Federal system of copyright,
that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged”); Pamela Samuelson, Why
Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921,
1952 (2007) (analyzing portions of the House and Senate Reports relating to § 102(b)).
49
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (“This
listing was not intended to be exhaustive . . . . The fact that an article arguably is ’news’ and therefore a
productive use is simply one factor in a fair use analysis.”); WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT
§10.12 (2018) (“The preamble to Section 107 begins by enumerating illustrative methods of reproduction
. . . and then enumerates illustrative purposes to which such reproductions are put.”).
53
17 U.S.C. §§ 107(1)–(4) (2012).
54
See Ilanah Fhima, Fairness in Copyright Law: An Anglo-American Comparison, 34 SANTA
CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 44, 45 (2017) (comparing fair use and fair dealing).
55
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (stating that fair use law
permits courts to avoid “rigid application” and that the statute calls for case-by-case analysis).
56
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
47
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protection in what computer professionals refer to as “libraries” of
Application Programming Interfaces (“APIs”).57 API libraries can be
described as compilations of preprogrammed packets of computer code and
associated declarations that are used to “call” the implementing code,
triggering the implementing code to perform specified functions.58 For those
familiar with Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, it might help to think of an API
declaration as a statement analogous to “=average(D5:D7),” a statement that
instructs a computer to run code in the Excel program that will yield the
average of entries in rows five through seven of column D of an Excel
spreadsheet.
The specific background for Oracle’s complaint is as follows. Oracle’s
predecessor, Sun Microsystems, developed the Java computer language.59 It
also created packages of libraries for functions.60 Each function in these
libraries is a pre-written segment of code that carries out a specific task—
for example, a mathematical calculation, communication with a device, or a
graphic operation.61 Rather than rewrite code, Java programmers can use
these pre-fabricated functions to perform the relevant task. Oracle did not
assert copyright in the Java language, and Google never copied the code in
the libraries62 except for a very short, nine-line segment of code, which
Google copied along with eight computer files.63 Instead, Google
independently wrote its own libraries and made them available to
programmers who wished to use the Java language to write software
programs able to run on the Android mobile operating system.64 With respect
to these libraries, which are the focus of our concern here, what Google did
copy and Oracle argued was covered by copyright were the Java libraries’
APIs, namely: (1) the names and syntax for the declarations used to call
57

Id. at 1347, 1349.
Id. at 1349–50.
59
Id. at 1348 n.1.
60
Id. at 1348–49.
61
Id.
62
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Google decided to
use the Java language to design its own virtual machine via its own software and to write its own
implementations for the functions in the Java API that were key to mobile devices.”), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
63
Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1351 (“It is undisputed, however, that Google wrote its own implementing
code, except with respect to: (1) the rangeCheck function, which consisted of nine lines of code; and (2)
eight decompiled security files.”). The district court issued a judgment holding in part that Google had
infringed the copyright for the eight copied files and the short segment of “rangeCheck” code, and the
Federal Circuit affirmed these portions of the district court’s judgment. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1347–48
(affirming the holding of copyright infringement for the eight decompiled files and denying Google’s
cross-appeal on the rangeCheck function). For Google’s infringement of the rangeCheck code, the district
court had “entered judgment in the amount of zero dollars per the parties’ stipulation.” Oracle Am., Inc.
v. Google Inc., No. C:10-3561, 2012 WL 9028839 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2012).
64
Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1350–51 (describing Google’s development and release of its libraries as part
of the Android platform).
58
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associated functions; and (2) the relationships between the individual
functions and their taxonomic structure.66
In other words, Oracle argued that it had created a work subject to
copyright protection that comprised not only the API declarations’ names
and syntax, but also the complex and abstract informational structure
embodied in the way that the numerous functions were organized, classified,
and related to each other. The reason for Google’s copying of these elements
is obvious: it wanted to swiftly mobilize the substantial community of Java
programmers to produce Android software without having to learn a
complex set of new conventions.67
Oracle argued that the copied Java libraries’ APIs are protectable
expression.68 One of Google’s main counterarguments was that the structure
of the APIs is an unprotectable “command structure” under § 102(b), and
that any expression embodied in them merged with their functional aspect.69
At the heart of this highly technical dispute was a battle over
interoperability. Interoperability is the ability of technology—hardware or
software—to work or communicate with other technology.70 Especially in
the context of computer software, one of the important functions of
§ 102(b)’s preclusion of copyrighting functionality is to ensure access to
interoperability.71 Just as a highly sophisticated new cellphone that cannot
be connected to existing networks might as well be used as a doorstop, even
an otherwise-superior spreadsheet application will be seriously
disadvantaged if it cannot read the file format used by other established
65
Id. at 1351. The court’s opinion confusingly refers to the syntax of the libraries’ declarations as
“the declaring code.” Id. The declarations are not the code of the libraries, however, but simply the
conventions used in calling them. For example, the declaration “public static int max(int x, int y)” is used
to call a function that has certain traits and returns an integer number that is the larger of two input
integers. See id. at 1349–50 (explaining declarations and how functions are “called”).
66
Id. at 1351. The opinion refers to this aspect as the “structure, sequence, and organization” (SSO)
of the libraries. Id.
67
Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (“As to the 37 packages at issue, Google believed Java application
programmers would want to find the same 37 sets of functionalities in the new Android system callable
by the same names as used in Java.”).
68
Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1353.
69
Id. at 1353, 1356.
70
A standard definition of interoperability in the context of information and communication
technology is “[t]he capability to communicate, execute[] programs, or transfer data among various
functional units in a manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique
characteristics of those units.” Int’l Electrotechnical Comm. [IEC], Information Technology Vocabulary,
at 6, ISO/IEC 2382-1 (3d ed. 1993); see also Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding
Interoperability?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1943, 1946–48 (2009) (defining interoperability).
71
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 536 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“‘[L]ock-out’ codes fall on the functional-idea rather than the original-expression side of the copyright
line.”); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[F]unctional
requirements for compatibility . . . are not protected by copyright.”); see also Samuelson, supra note 48,
at 1976 (advocating the conclusion that “systematic assemblages of information such as specifications
of interfaces necessary to achieve interoperability are unprotectable under § 102(b)”).
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applications to store data, and thus requires re-entry of the data as a
prerequisite to manipulation by the application. Standard economic
reasoning provides two related explanations why interoperability is an
important policy goal: network externalities and lock-in effects due to sunk
investment.
Positive network externalities are the beneficial effects enjoyed by each
user of a resource as a result of use by others.72 The classic example is a
telephone network where the value of a device is virtually zero if operated
in isolation but steadily increases in relation to the number of users
connected to the network.73 When a particular resource, such as a wellestablished network or standard, is subject to high network effects, exclusion
of newcomers from enjoying these externalities is likely to erect substantial
barriers to entry.74 Consider the plight of an entrant who tries to establish a
new local telephone network but is denied interconnectivity with the
national network. How many customers will sign up for the entrant’s
service?
Lock-in effects often work in conjunction with network externalities. At
the heart of this phenomenon are sunk investments that generate path
dependence75 or what scientists or engineers might describe more
specifically as a form of hysteresis.76 Consider a firm that invests heavily in
training its employees in mastering the protocols for operating a machine
central for its business. Sometime later, a new machine superior in
performance enters the market. If the new machine could be substituted
seamlessly for the old one without requiring new employee training, the new
machine’s acquisition and deployment would raise the firm’s profit margin
72
See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J.
ECON. 70, 70–71 (1985) (defining network externalities); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) (discussing sources
of positive consumption externalities).
73
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 424.
74
See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. REV. 479, 523 (1998) (“To the extent intellectual property rights confer ownership interests in a
strong network standard, they may create durable market power in network markets . . . . But if one firm
owned the rights to produce keyboards with a QWERTY layout, it could exclude others from obtaining
the benefits of the standard.”).
75
See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 648
(1996) (describing how path dependence due to sunk cost may lead to inefficient results); Paul A. David,
Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 335–36 (1985) (arguing that the “quasiirreversibility of investments” in typing skills contributed to locking in the QWERTY typewriter
keyboard alongside network externalities). But see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of
the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–3 (1990) (questioning this argument in relation to the QWERTY
keyboard).
76
See, e.g., C.J. ADKINS, EQUILIBRIUM THERMODYNAMICS 10 (3d ed. 1983) (“Friction is a common
cause of hysteresis.”); NEIL W. ASHCROFT & N. DAVID MERMIN, SOLID STATE PHYSICS 722 (1976)
(defining “hysteresis” as how, after a piece of iron has been magnetized through application of a magnetic
field, it can “become[] necessary to apply a rather strong field in the opposite direction to restore the
unmagnetized configuration”).
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from P1 to P2, where P2 > P1 despite the costs of such acquisition and
deployment. Suppose, however, that the new machine requires expensive
new training costing the amount T in order for the machine to be used
successfully as a substitute for the earlier machine. Expected profit from
using the new machine will then be only P2 – T. If P2 – T is less than P1, a
rational profit-maximizing firm will not adopt the new machine: the firm
will be “locked into” the inferior technology. Significantly, such “lock-in”
can occur even when, in the absence of the need for the new investment in
training—for example, because existing operating protocols can be used
without alteration for the new machine—both the firm’s private interest and
the social welfare calculus point in favor of adopting the newer technology.
Network and lock-in effects due to sunk investment have a common
adverse effect: they create barriers to entry.77 If significant enough, they can
inefficiently chill competition and the introduction of socially beneficial
innovations.78 Various features of the computer software industry—
including the highly cumulative nature of its technology, the industry’s
reliance on networks of users, operators, and developers, and associated
reliance on standards—make the industry an especially fertile ground for
network externalities and lock-in effects.79 And by allowing new software to
use or interact with key aspects of existing software, interoperability can
often dissolve or mitigate associated entry barriers for new technologies or
new industry players.80 Copyright law uses § 102(b) and the related merger
doctrine as mechanisms for preventing these pernicious effects in various
expressive fields and in software in particular.81 By designating information
structures or expressive elements needed for interoperability as functional
and therefore unprotected, § 102(b) and the merger doctrine ensure access

77
See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 74, at 522–23 (“[C]ompetition between different networks
may be counterproductive in certain circumstances.”).
78
See id. at 522 (“[N]etwork effects may foreclose competition entirely or limit effective
competition to that occurring between members of the same network.”).
79
See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1057 (1989) (describing the cumulative nature of software development); Peter
S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1341 (1987)
(discussing the standard-oriented nature of the computer industry).
80
See Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright
Protection of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 305, 466
(2018) (arguing that copyright should allow “freedom to use functional features and to develop
interoperable products” while patent law should protect functional elements of software to ensure proper
incentive for their development and avoid certain negative effects related to network externalities).
81
Cf. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839–40 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (observing
that although computer code is generally copyrightable expression of a way to implement a process, “[i]f
the patentable process is embodied inextricably in the line-by-line instructions of the computer program,
. . . then the process merges with the expression and precludes copyright protection”).
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82

to network externalities and help prevent inefficient lock-in.
Notably, however, the interoperability interest in Oracle was of a
peculiar kind.83 The Federal Circuit decided the case on the assumption that
Google’s libraries did not make preexisting Java code interoperable with the
Android operating system.84 Indeed, Oracle complained that Google was
compromising the “write once, run anywhere” hallmark of Java by failing to
provide for such interoperability.85 If Google could not claim that the
copying was necessary to achieve interoperability between the Android
system and preexisting Java code, then what interoperability interest was it
asserting?
The remaining argument—that relevant interoperability was at stake—
focused on Google’s interest in drawing on the significant resource of the
existing Java programming community in order to ensure fast and robust
application development for the Android environment.86 This could be
called an interest in the interoperability of Android with preexisting
programming potential. There remains the question of why the use of
preexisting APIs should be viewed as “functional.” After all, Google could
have used new and different declaration syntax and a different library
taxonomy in providing the desired prefabricated functionalities to Java
programmers. How then are the syntax and taxonomy of APIs functional?
The answer lies in the fact that the functional purpose of an API is to
“interface” with programmers, facilitating their development of application
programs.87 In this context, demanding that Google use a different syntax
and a different taxonomy is analogous to telling a developer of a new
cellphone both to create its own network and to induce a critical mass of
users to switch to the new network. To prevent programmers from being
locked into traditional Java by virtue of their sunk investments in learning
the syntax and structure of its libraries, Google needed more than perfectly
workable libraries. It needed its libraries to make programmers’ sunk
investment transferable. And to achieve that, it needed to follow established
conventions from the Java libraries. Anyone who wanted effective
interoperability with established programming capital needed to use
Oracle’s associated expression, just as anyone who wanted to use Selden’s
accounting method needed to use his chart.
Whether the peculiar kind of interoperability asserted by Google should
82

See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819–20 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring) (discussing § 102(b) as one doctrinal alternative for addressing issues of lock-in and network
externalities in computer software).
83
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
84
Id. at 1371.
85
Id. at 1350.
86
Id. at 1371 (“Google wanted to capitalize on the fact that software developers were already trained
and experienced in using the Java API packages.”).
87
Id. at 1349.
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be safeguarded from copyright protection is open for debate (although we
believe the answer is “Yes”).88 What matters for our purposes is the Court’s
analysis of the interoperability argument and how this analysis reflected an
understanding of the relationship between § 102(b) and fair use.
The Federal Circuit rejected Google’s argument by developing a vision
of a strict separation between § 102(b) and fair use.89 Section 102(b), the
court said, is about the eligibility of certain subject matter created by authors
for copyright, while fair use is about whether certain actions by users are
infringing.90 As such, the two never intersect in a theoretical sense, and each
is applied from a very different perspective. Section 102(b) is applied ex ante
from the point of view of the author of the protected work at the moment of
creation.91 Its analysis asks, whether at that time and from the perspective of
the author, a particular expressive form was functional or merged with
functional elements.92 Fair use, and fair use alone, is applied ex post from
the perspective of a user of a copyrighted work to examine whether at that
point there exist any circumstances that excuse the copying.93
This framing of the relationship between § 102(b) and fair use sealed the
fate of Google’s § 102(b) argument by requiring that this argument be
assessed from an ex ante perspective. When Sun created the Java libraries,
it was free to choose any syntax and structure for them, unhampered by any

88

Many commentators support allowing copying for purposes of interoperability in circumstances
such as those in Oracle. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Three Fundamental Flaws in CAFC’s Oracle v.
Google Decision, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 702, 702 (2015) (arguing, in part, that the Oracle court
misinterpreted aspects of § 102); Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and
Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1515, 1566 (2016) (discussing
Ninth Circuit decisions that held that “the code necessary for interoperability is uncopyrightable”);
Wendy J. Gordon, How Oracle Erred: The Use/Explanation Distinction and the Future of Computer
Copyright, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 375, 375 (Ruth L. Okediji
ed., 2017) (arguing that the “Oracle court may have been asking the wrong question” when determining
copyrightability).
89
Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1354. The Federal Circuit’s driving of a strong doctrinal wedge between
§ 102(b) and fair use analysis resonates with similar clarification-and-compartmentalization moves that
have marked the historical development of patent law, an area of U.S. law for which the Federal Circuit
has virtually exclusive authority to hear initial appeals. See Golden, supra note 6, at 684–90 (describing
a long-term trend toward doctrinal compartmentalization in patent law). But, whatever the value of the
Federal Circuit’s helping to continue this long-term trend in patent law, one can wonder about the wisdom
of the court’s transferring compartmentalization tendencies to copyright, a field in which the court is less
expert and can expect generally to be applying the law of various regional circuits. See Oracle, 750 F.3d
at 1353 (noting that “[c]opyright issues are not exclusively assigned to the Federal Circuit” and that,
accordingly, “[t]he parties agree that Ninth Circuit law applies”).
90
Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1372 (The ability of a copier to achieve interoperability “might be relevant
to the fair use inquiry,” but it is “irrelevant to the copyrightability” analysis.).
91
Id. at 1361.
92
Id. (“[C]opyrightability and the scope of protectable activity are to be evaluated at the time of
creation, not at the time of infringement.”).
93
Id. at 1369 (dismissing the relevance for § 102(b) analysis of previous decisions that recognized
a copier’s interest in interoperability because they were “focused on fair use”).
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functionality, interoperability, or merger concerns. At the moment of their
creation, there was no preexisting network, either technological or human,
that necessitated a particular structure for the Java libraries to achieve
effective interconnectivity with an already developed community of Java
programmers.95
Does the Federal Circuit’s neat and tidy vision of strict separation
between functionality and fair use work? It does work perfectly, but only in
von Jhering’s Heaven of Legal Concepts.96 The Federal Circuit’s reasoning
is unburdened by any attempt to understand the underlying purpose of
§ 102(b) or the socioeconomic and technological context in which it
operates. But establishing the proper understanding of § 102(b) and its
relationship to fair use can only be done in light of these doctrines’ relevant
purposes.
The denial of copyrightability to functional subject matter and the
associated merger doctrine are about the freedom of subsequent users to use
such subject matter (unless it is patented).97 What matters here is not some
metaphysical inquiry about whether the material in which copyright is
asserted is inherently functional or expressive. The relevant inquiry is a
pragmatic one: whether copyright in the relevant elements amounts to
exclusive control of actions—which as a matter of social practice are within
the realm of functional utility—rather than just the sort of creative
expression that is copyright’s proper domain. When the lens is switched
from metaphysics to pragmatism, the inquiry can hardly be undertaken
without considering the effects on users. This is doubly true when the
pertinent concern of “functionality” is interoperability. As explained, the
policy concern here is about network externalities and lock-in effects in the
interface between human behavior and technological networks. These
94

Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1371. The Federal Circuit went on to analyze the framework for a fair use analysis of the
case and remanded it to the district court for further proceedings on this issue. Id. at 1373–77. In March
2018, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court on this issue and found Google’s actions not to
constitute fair use. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Google has
filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which is currently pending. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Oracle
Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, Nos. 17-1118, -1202 (Fed. Cir. petition dated May 29, 2018), available at
https://patentlyo.com/media/2018/05/Oracle-Am.-v.-Google-LLC-Rehearing-Petition.pdf.
96
Rudolf von Jhering, Im juristichen Begriffshimmel, in SCHERZ UND ERNST IN DER JURISPRUDENZ
(1884) (Ger.), translated in In the Heaven for Legal Concepts: A Fantasy, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 799, 799 (1985).
Felix Cohen borrowed von Jhering’s metaphor and made it a common designation in American legal
thought of overly conceptualist legal thinking disconnected from considerations of purpose and policy.
See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809
(1935) (explaining that the heaven of legal concepts in von Jehring’s work is a place where legal concepts
exist in their “absolute purity, freed from all entangling alliances with human life”).
97
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 535 (observing that
when expression and ideas merge, “copyright protection does not exist because granting protection to the
expressive component of the work necessarily would extend protection to the work’s uncopyrightable”
elements).
95
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effects can shield an incumbent from competition and create a barrier for the
development and entry of innovative products. Network and lock-in effects,
however, almost always develop over time. There was no network effect
when, in 1876, Bell first spoke the words “Watson come here” over a
telephone line,98 and any lock-in effect was of trivial social magnitude just
after the first typist learned to use a QWERTY keyset on a typewriter.99
There is nothing unusual about considering ex post effects on users as
part of IP subject matter rules.100 The genericity doctrine in trademark
precludes protection for marks that designate for the public not a specific
source of goods, but a whole type of goods.101 The doctrine of subsequent
genericity is founded on the idea that a particular mark, such as
“cellophane,” “thermos,” or “Murphy bed,” might initially designate only a
particular source of goods, but over time end up being generic.102 At that
point of subsequent genericity, trademark protection is lost.
Likewise, in copyright, one finds the scènes à faire doctrine. Under this
rule, common or stock elements within a particular expressive genre do not
receive copyright protection.103 Under this doctrine, even the first creator of
a shoot-out at high noon scene in a western movie cannot control such
98

TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 22 (2010).
See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 18 (2012) (noting reference to “the QWERTY typewriter
keyboard” as an example of lock-in, but also noting dispute over whether there was a substantially
superior alternative on which users would have otherwise converged); see also David, supra note 76, at
335 36 (discussing the QWERTY “lock in” effect); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 76 (responding
to David’s work regarding QWERTY history); Paul A. David, At Last, a Remedy for Chronic QWERTYSkepticism! (Sept. 31, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (responding to critiques of
his work on QWERTY).
100
For a general argument that the passage of time affects the policies underlying copyright, see
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 411–12 (2002) (concluding that
the strength and impact of theoretical justifications for copyright law are quite directly affected by the
passage of time). In this article, however, Liu suggests adjusting copyright’s scope to the passage of time
through the fair use doctrine, not subject matter rules. Id.
101
See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896) (explaining that when a patent
expires, the public has a right to make the property in the same manner it was made during the patent);
DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1936) (“The fact that it had
registered ‘Cellophane’ as a trademark would give it no right to monopolize a term useful to designate a
commercial article.”); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 12.1 (5th ed. 2018) (“[A] generic name of a product can never function as a trademark
to indicate origin.”).
102
See, e.g., Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1989)
(“We hold that ‘Murphy bed’ is a generic term, having been appropriated by the public to designate
generally a type of bed.”); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963)
(noting that over a period of approximately fifty years, the term “thermos” became widely used to
describe a generic type of insulation).
103
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B][4] (2018). See
also Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Neither does copyright protection
extend to copyright or ‘stock’ themes commonly linked to a particular genre.”); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am.
Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (expounding on the scènes à faire
approach with respect to literary works).
99
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scenes’ general use. In Oracle, Google tried repackaging essentially the
same interoperability argument as a scènes à faire claim.105 The court
dismissed it for the same reasons it dismissed the § 102(b) claim—i.e., that
the scènes à faire doctrine focuses “on the circumstances presented to the
creator, not the copier.”106 But how can scènes à faire be analyzed except
from the ex post perspective of users? To be scènes à faire, an expressive
element must be a stock element of a genre, and both a genre and what counts
as stock elements within it almost inevitably develop over time.107 It is
always fundamental early or earlier works that define what stock elements
are from the point of view of subsequent creators. And to apply the doctrine
from the ex ante point of view—looking from the moment where the earlier
works were about to be created and gradually form the genre—would make
the doctrine incoherent and defeat its purpose. Imagine that whether a train
robbery scene is scènes à faire in western movies was analyzed from the
point of view of Edwin S. Porter making his The Great Train Robbery in
1903.108 The same logic applies to § 102(b) in general and interoperability
in particular. The collective dynamics of cultural and technological
networks—especially those which are the concern of copyright policy—
often develop over time. To restrict § 102(b) to the ex ante perspective of
the creator of the protected work is to gut it.
Fine, the skeptic might say, Oracle may gut §102(b), but there is no need
to worry because fair use can still effectively protect interoperability by
immunizing subsequent users from liability when such a concern arises. To
push the argument one step further: this arrangement may be preferable
because it avoids the inefficient and confusing redundancy that would occur
if choices facilitating interoperability were shielded by both fair use and
§ 102(b). Therefore, it is better to let fair use take care of users’ ex post
concern and push functionality to a marginal or non-existent role on such an
issue.
This anti-redundancy argument fails to account for how the relevant
doctrines operate in practice. Fair use is a broad, open-ended standard. As a
result, applying it often entails a complex and frequently informationintensive and expensive inquiry, one reaching far beyond the functionality,

104

See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, § 13.03[B][4] (“[C]ertain patterns and situations are
bound to recur.”).
105
750 F.3d 1339, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
106
Id. at 1364.
107
Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 846 n.11 (9th Cir. 2004).
108
The Great Train Robbery is a 1903 silent film. THE GREAT TRAIN ROBBERY (Edwin S. Porter
1903). It is widely recognized as featuring ground breaking movie-making techniques, and many film
historians consider it the first Western film. See NORMAN O. KEIM, OUR MOVIE HOUSES: A HISTORY OF
FILM & CINEMATIC INNOVATION IN CENTRAL NEW YORK 17 (2008).
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or non-functionality, of a particular form of expression. Because of this
complexity and the open-ended nature of the doctrine, the fair use doctrine’s
case-by-case outcomes can be hard to predict.110 This remains so despite the
mitigating effect, pointed out by some scholars, of observable patterns in fair
use decisions.111 By comparison with fair use inquiries, application of
§ 102(b) tends to be much more focused in terms of relevant facts and much
more liable to development of relatively straightforward, rule-like precedent
such as a potential rule that APIs with substantial network externalities are
presumptively functional. Finally and importantly, fair use and § 102(b)
ordinarily involve different assignments of the ultimate burden of proof:
whereas argument on the basis of § 102(b) is generally understood to
implicate preconditions for copyrightability on which copyright holder bears
the burden,112 the Supreme Court has indicated fair use to be an affirmative
defense for which the defendant bears the burden.113 Consequently, not only
may a party facing a potential charge of copyright infringement predict with
far greater assurance that it will prevail on the basis of functionality, rather
than fair use, but that party also may expect to prevail on functionality
109
See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1092–96 (2007) (explaining
and analyzing the causes of fair use uncertainty).
110
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1132 (1990) (“Whether
[a] taking[ ] will pass the fair use test is difficult to predict. It depends on widely varying perceptions
held by different judges.”).
111
See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008) (detailing attempts to establish a systematic, comprehensive account of U.S.
fair use case law); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009)
(arguing that fair use cases tend to fall in policy-relevant clusters); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making
Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715 (2011) (displaying a historical order of fair use case
law to show its predictability).
112
See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 438 (“Courts generally put the burden of proof of non-merger
on plaintiffs because to establish a prima facie case of infringement requires proof that the defendant
appropriated original expression from the plaintiff’s work.”). The extent to which § 102(b) is applied as
a precondition for copyrightability or as an affirmative defense is in fact a matter of some contention. In
Oracle, the Federal Circuit acknowledged some disagreement on this question in relation to application
of the related doctrines of merger and scènes à faire. 750 F.3d at 1358. However, the particular case law
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was understood to govern copyright issues in Oracle
and the Federal Circuit determined that the Ninth Circuit had “clear[ly]” held that these doctrines are
affirmative defenses. Id. at 1353, 1358. This approach received scholarly criticism for ignoring subtleties
introduced by § 102(b)’s relevance, under previous courts’ approaches, to both threshold questions of
copyrightability and an infringement analysis that distinguishes between copyrighted and noncopyrighted material. See Menell, supra note 89, at 1569 (criticizing the Federal Circuit for rigidly
focusing on Ninth Circuit cases that treated the two doctrines as defenses to infringement rather than
copyrightability doctrines).
113
Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (observing that “fair use is an
affirmative defense”). One might question whether fair use should be an affirmative defense. Lydia Pallas
Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 688 (2015) (contending that the
Supreme Court “should conclude that fair use is not an affirmative defense but is a mere defense”). We
do not pursue that question as the key point for our overall concern with the structural relationships
between legal doctrines, but simply that the existence of redundant inquiries such as those into fair use
and compliance with § 102(b) enables the sort of differential assignment of burdens discussed in the text.

2019]

REDUNDANCY AND ANTI-REDUNDANCY IN COPYRIGHT

269

substantially earlier and more cheaply in any ensuing litigation—whether on
a motion to dismiss based on pleadings or on summary judgment—rather
than after a full trial.114
The implications of the above are twofold. First, the prospect of
mounting a fair use defense often offers parties who fear allegations of
copyright infringement no more upfront than the right to engage in a long,
expensive legal process with an uncertain result.115 The predictable result
can be the “chilling” and likely overdeterrence of activity for which a strong
fair use defense can be mounted.116 The Federal Circuit epilogue in Oracle
demonstrates this point.117 When the Federal Circuit rejected Google’s
§ 102(b) argument, the court left open the possibility of exemption for
liability based on fair use.118 During the original trial, the jury had
deadlocked on this issue.119 The Federal Circuit responded with guidance for
the fair use analysis and remanded the case for further proceedings.120 Back
in the trial court, the jury found Google’s use of the Java APIs to be fair, and
the district court denied Oracle’s motion to overturn the verdict by a
judgment as a matter of law.121 The district court judge supported this
decision with detailed legal reasoning in favor of upholding the fair use
outcome.122 On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit reversed the district
114
In this way, restrictions on copyrighting functional subject matter can operate like patent law’s
subject-matter eligibility restrictions as mechanisms for disposing of “weak cases quickly and cheaply.”
Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Procedure of Patent Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming) (Apr. 2018 draft,
at 5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3161621.
115
See Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 HOUS.
L. REV. 673, 679 (2003) (noting that “vague” copyright doctrine encourages “[a]ggressive copyright
claims”); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J.
882, 887 (2007) (discussing four factors that lead users to seek licenses even where unauthorized use will
not result in liability).
116
See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 434 (2007)
(observing the chilling effect of uncertainty in fair use); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman,
Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1497–98 (2007) (discussing the problem of overdeterrence in
copyright).
117
The question of whether there will be a “Supreme Court epilogue” is pending. On January 24,
2019, Google filed a petition for certiorari asking not only whether “petitioner’s use of a software
interface in the context of creating a new computer program constitutes a fair use,” but also “[w]hether
copyright protection extends to a software interface,” which the petition defined as “lines of computer
code that allow developers to operate prewritten libraries of code used to perform particular tasks.”
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Google LLC v. Oracle Am. Inc., No. 18-956 (U.S. S. Ct. Jan. 24,
2019),
available
at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/18-956.html .
118
Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1368 (“[W]e conclude that Section 102(b) does not bar the packages from
copyright protection . . . .”); id. at 1376 (“[W]e remand the fair use question for a new trial.”).
119
Id. at 1347.
120
Id. at 1374–77.
121
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2016 WL 3181206, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
June 8, 2016), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
122
Id. at *3–11.
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court, overturned the jury’s verdict, and found no fair use. In the course
of reaching this endpoint, the Federal Circuit held that a conclusion that
“Google’s use of the API packages [was] anything other than
overwhelmingly commercial” lacked any “substantial evidentiary
support,”124 that Google’s use was “not transformative as a matter of law,”125
that “no reasonable jury could conclude that what was copied was
qualitatively insignificant,”126 and that “no reasonable jury could have
concluded that there was no market harm to Oracle from Google’s
copying.”127 The Federal Circuit effectively disagreed with the trial court on
all four of these issues, two of which—the transformative nature of the use
and market harm—are commonly considered the two most outcomedeterminative elements of the fair use analysis.128
What is most relevant for the current discussion, however, is not the
Federal Circuit’s reasoning on the second appeal or this reasoning’s result.
Instead, what is most relevant is the tortuous procedural route to this fair use
result, a route that has involved two jury trials and two appeals, and after
Google’s filing for a rehearing en banc,129 is still incomplete. Google has
been able to follow this winding and expensive path to its so far bitter end.
Other less wealthy or established players are more likely to quit earlier,
rather than fight for so long to vindicate a fair use argument. Alternatively,
anticipating a potential charge of copyright infringement and the need for a
lengthy and costly legal battle to prevail against it, they might avoid any
action that would risk such a charge in the first place.
This conclusion leads to the second point: the chilling effect of the
complex and uncertain fair use doctrine does not affect all parties equally.
Well-established and well-financed players are generally better placed to
undertake an expensive and risky fair use defense, a course that will at least
offer the relatively certain benefit of delaying any unfavorable final
judgment.130 But smaller, less-established players are not as well positioned
123

Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1211.
Id. at 1198.
125
Id. at 1199.
126
Id. at 1207.
127
Id. at 1209. For an argument that a reasonable jury could have upheld Google’s fair use defense,
see Pamela Samuelson & Clark D. Asay, Saving Software's Fair Use Future, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
535, 557 (2018).
128
See Beebe, supra note 112, at 584 (“[T]he outcomes of factors one and four very strongly
correlated with the test outcome and fairly strongly correlated with each other.”). More recent empirical
scholarship has tended to emphasize the relative importance of the transformativeness inquiry under the
first fair use factor in comparison to the market-harm inquiry under the fourth factor. See, e.g., Netanel,
supra note 112, at 745 (explaining that today the most important factor is transformative use); Matthew
Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 48, 76 (2012) (discussing the possibility that transformative
use is the most important factor).
129
See supra note 94.
130
HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 148 (2011) (arguing that broad
standards tend to generate regressive results by favoring repeat players).
124
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to survive the process and are more likely to forgo the defense altogether.131
This is particularly worrisome when much concern about interoperability
revolves around maintaining robust entry to markets or, in other words,
allowing dynamic upstarts to challenge an entrenched technological
incumbent. Here, an unpredictable doctrine that is expensive to apply likely
disfavors exactly those who need its protection the most. In contrast, by
relying on a more streamlined inquiry with the burden on the copyright
holder, robust enforcement of § 102(b) can provide such upstarts much more
reassurance.
Section 102(b), then, has an important role to play despite its partial
overlap with fair use, meaning that both may lead to similar results on the
basis of similar circumstances. Perhaps, however, we should try the opposite
tack and eliminate redundancy by taking fair use out of the business of
helping to shield steps taken to achieve interoperability. Is the optimal
arrangement a mirror image of the Federal Circuit’s version of strict
separation in Oracle? Not quite. For reasons indicated above, § 102(b)
should play the lead role here, but fair use still has an important function.
To begin with, a fair use doctrine that partially overlaps with § 102(b)
analysis can provide a variety of safety-net functions. The doctrine can be
an error-correcting failsafe in technology-intensive, complex cases such as
Oracle, where juries or even judges might find it difficult to digest the
intricacies of relevant technologies, or of the legal distinction between
function and expression. In other words, in certain cases that should have
been caught in the functionality net but escaped it, fair use can “save the
day” by generating the right outcome—exemption from infringement
liability—even when a court has erred in finding relevant subject matter to
be copyrightable. Moreover, notwithstanding the generally more unwieldy
nature of fair use analysis, there can be some circumstances—such as where
there is an on-point, precedential finding of fair use—where the fair use
doctrine might even provide an easier route to a conclusion of no liability.
More importantly, in yet another set of cases, fair use effectuates the
freedom to achieve interoperability where other doctrinal levers, including
§ 102(b), currently cannot. Often, extracting unprotectable functional
information necessary for interoperability requires some copying of
protected expressive materials. In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,132
for example, a video game developer wanted to independently create games
compatible with the Sega console.133 To achieve that result, it needed access
to the communication protocols of the console, information that is
131
See Xun (Michael) Liu, Joinder Under AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent Assertions
Away From Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 494 (2012) (concluding, in a
similar way, that patent litigation is unfavorable to small businesses).
132
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
133
See id. at 1514–15 (explaining the developer’s attempts to make a compatible game).
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unprotected by copyright but was not readily available. As a practical
matter, the only way for the developer to obtain the unprotected
communication protocols of the console was to reverse-engineer them by
decompiling and examining copyrighted code of Sega games, a process that
inevitably involved temporary copying of the games’ code.135 This game
code was not functional under § 102(b) and hence was fully
copyrightable.136 In principle, copyright law might have permitted
temporary copying of such copyrighted code on grounds that it is not even a
prima facie violation of the reproduction right when incidental to a purpose
such as Accolade’s.137 But in the United States, that route was foreclosed
long ago by courts and is unlikely to be reopened.138 In Sega, the court found
a lack of copyright liability by deploying the fair use doctrine to exempt such
ancillary copying for purposes of gaining access to functional information
necessary for interoperability.139
In this auxiliary role as a support for functionality rules under § 102(b),
it is exactly the open-ended nature of fair use that is crucial. In a complex
and fast-changing technological and economic environment, it is hard to
predict the exact set of circumstances or strategies that might arise and
frustrate the purpose of rules meant to protect important policy goals such
as broadly available interoperability. The flexible fair use doctrine can
enable the “right” social result in such cases where otherwise easier-to-use
rules are too rigid to be extended, and legislative involvement, commonly
plodding, is inadequate. What emerges, then, is the possibility of a particular
kind of beneficial redundancy structure: a set of rules under § 102(b) that in
a broad array of circumstances generates the “right” social result based on a
relatively limited set of facts, along with a broad standard that acts as a
failsafe for both the limitations of the § 102(b) rules and for errors in their
application.
In short, fair use still has an important role to play alongside § 102(b). It
134
Id. at 1515 (discussing how Accolade engineers “experimented to discover the interface
specifications for the Genesis console”).
135
Id. at 1520 (finding fair use because “disassembly [of copyrighted object code was] the only
means of gaining access to th[e relevant] unprotected aspects of the program.”).
136
Id. (“[T]he copyright in a computer program extends to the object code version of the program.”).
137
Another alternative is to have a specific statutory rule allowing copying for purposes of
interoperability under such circumstances. This is the strategy adopted in the European Union. Council
Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 6, 1991 O.J.
(L 122) 0042.
138
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1519 (holding “intermediate copying” of code for purposes of interoperability
to be infringing).
139
Id. at 1514 (noting that the copying of a copyrighted computer code to gain access to
unprotectable functional elements is fair use when “the person seeking the understanding has a legitimate
reason for doing so and when no other means of access to the unprotected elements exists”); see also
Sony Comput. Entm’t v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602–09 (2000) (finding the intermediate
copying of BIOS code in the course of reverse engineering a video game console to be fair use).
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can correct for errors, occasionally offer an easier route to an identical result,
and provide auxiliary protection for social interests such as interoperability
in the face of dynamic and varied circumstances. When informed by concern
with underlying policies and implemented with sensitivity to how relevant
doctrines function in practice, partial redundancy between § 102(b)
limitations and the fair use doctrine is beneficial. Moreover, for purposes of
exempting activities associated with securing a functional end such as
interoperability, a structural combination in which § 102(b) is the primary
mechanism and the fair use doctrine is a more general backstop emerges as
a preferred design.
B. Fair Use and Improper Appropriation
To establish copyright infringement, it is insufficient to show copying
from a protected work. The prima facie case of infringement also requires
establishing that the copied work is substantially similar to the original.140
This improper appropriation requirement has been under pressure in recent
decades.141 One line of decisions eroded the requirement by characterizing
it as a rare exception for de minimis copying that can prevent liability only
when the taking is so trivial as to be completely unrecognizable.142 For
example, one recent decision found that the copying of a modified 0.23second segment of horns from a protected song did not constitute improper
appropriation only because “a reasonable juror could not conclude that an
average audience would recognize the appropriation . . . .”143
Other decisions have found improper appropriation on the ground that
even the scant copied material at issue cleared the low hurdle of being
recognizable as having been taken from the original.144 This is a
140
See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (identifying two elements necessary for
a copyright infringement case: copying and improper appropriation); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
103, § 13.01[B] (explaining the elements a plaintiff must prove in an infringement action, including the
substantially similar standard).
141
See Oren Bracha, Not De Minimis: (Improper) Appropriation in Copyright, AM. U. L. REV., at
1 (forthcoming 2018) (on file with authors) (discussing recent attacks on the requirement for improper
appropriation as a prerequisite for copyright infringement).
142
See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 887 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We hold that the ‘de
minimis’ exception applies to actions alleging infringement of a copyright to sound recordings.”);
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he de minimis maxim and the general
test for substantial similarity . . . look[] to the response of the average audience, or ordinary observer, to
determine whether a use is infringing.”); Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.,
338 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]his is one of those relatively unusual cases in which the infringing
work has copied the original . . . .”); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
de minimis standard is satisfied only if a taking “is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience
would not recognize the appropriation”).
143
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 880. The court made its ruling with respect to both the copyright in
the musical composition and the sound recording. Id. at 879–80.
144
See, e.g., Danjaq, LLC v. Universal City Studios, LLC, No. CV 14–02527 SJO (Ex), 2014 WL
7882071, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2014) (noting that “iconic phrases such as ‘Bond. James Bond’ are both
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disconcerting development that conflicts with both the central role that
improper appropriation plays in modern copyright law as well as this
doctrine’s underlying policy.145
This enervation of the improper appropriation requirement is alarming.
Improper appropriation is one of copyright’s central mechanisms for striking
a balance between its beneficial incentives and social costs.146 In particular,
the requirement limits copyright’s negative dynamic effect on future
creation by allowing beneficial secondary uses of works whose inclusion
within the owner’s exclusive rights would produce little marginal incentive
for creation.147 Improper appropriation doctrine is thus a central mechanism
for recognizing that cultural innovation often happens through borrowing,
and even partial imitation of, existing works. More practically, this doctrine
helps balance the conflicting effects of copyright as both a promoter of
creation and a potential impediment to it.
A predictable objection is that the concern about the erosion of improper
appropriation is misguided because the fair use doctrine can adequately
carry out the function of shielding desirable secondary uses. Moreover, one
could argue that the preferred alternative is making fair use the primary
doctrinal lever for maintaining freedom for secondary uses. By reducing
improper appropriation to a rarely applied and relatively trivial exception,
this doctrinal design generally prevents any wasteful and confusing
duplication of coverage, and fair use’s open-endedness suggests that, in
principle, it is up to the desired protective task. Accordingly, some
commentators have criticized “the confusing overlap” between fair use and
the improper appropriation requirement,148 and at least one has called for the
abolition of the latter on this ground.149

recognizable and significant, so Defendants' de minimis argument holds little merit.”); Pryor v.
Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1221, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that plaintiff
sufficiently, though “just barely,” alleged that use of the two words “get down” from “Bumpin' Bus Stop”
constituted an infringement because of an average hearer’s possible recognition of the appropriation).
145
See Bracha, supra note 141 (discussing recent attacks on satisfaction of the requirement for
improper appropriation as a prerequisite to finding copyright infringement).
146
Cf. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 67 (Iris C. Geik et al. eds., 1967)
(criticizing the view “that infringement itself is decided without contamination by notions of
policy . . . .”).
147
Bracha, supra note 141.
148
Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial
Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 745–46 (1987); see also Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the
Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to Earth, 98 DICKINSON L. REV. 181, 189 (1994) (referring
to some scholars noticing and criticizing the overlap between fair use and substantial similarity); Michael
Ferdinand Sitzer, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in
Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 395 (1981) (criticizing “the duplication of
investigating market effects in the determination of substantial similarity” with the fourth fair use factor).
149
Cohen, supra note 148, at 760–61 (calling for the abolition of improper appropriation and
considering of dissimilarities between works only as part of the fair use analysis in order to eliminate

2019]

REDUNDANCY AND ANTI-REDUNDANCY IN COPYRIGHT

275

As with similar objections to overlap between § 102(b) and fair use, this
anti-redundancy objection falls flat because it fails to take seriously the way
in which the two supposedly completely overlapping doctrines work in
practice to advance relevant policies.150 Section II.A discussed one set of
reasons why fair use alone is insufficient to secure appropriate breathing
space for secondary creation.151 Being an open-ended standard applied by
courts as an affirmative defense, fair use is often unpredictable and likely to
require expensive and uncertain legal proceedings.152 The result is a chilling
effect on the activities of parties who might prefer to steer clear of the gray
area of uses of copyrighted works that a court might or might not deem
fair.153
Is improper appropriation any better than fair use in this respect?
Arguably, the substantial similarity standard, which is applied case by case
and often by juries, is at least as open-ended and unpredictable as fair use.154
Indeed, the question of whether there is substantial similarity is a wildcard
in many copyright cases.155 Hence, in permitting doctrines of fair use and
improper appropriation to overlap, we apparently do not derive the benefits
of the rules-versus-standard overlay enabled through overlapping coverage
of fair use and § 102(b). Without this, an anti-redundancy advocate might
contend, there can be no justification for overlapping coverage of fair use
“the undesirable duplication and overlap created by considering the similarities both as part of the
plaintiff’s case and as part of the fair use defense . . .”).
150
The analysis here assumes that the scope of the right extends well beyond verbatim reproduction
as is true of modern copyright. It is this extended scope that necessitates a regulating mechanism that
preserves breathing space for secondary uses. It has been suggested that the best alternative is to roll back
copyright to its much narrower historical scope. See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The
Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 738 (2012) (proposing that we should abandon substantial
similarity altogether). We bracket this option here for reasons of feasibility. This leaves fair use and
improper appropriation as the main doctrinal tools for addressing the policy issues underlying copyright’s
scope.
151
See supra text accompanying notes 106–16 (explaining the difficulty in applying, and predicting
outcomes of, the fair use doctrine).
152
See supra notes 106–08 (discussing the unpredictability of outcomes in fair use cases).
153
See supra text accompanying notes 117–30 (noting the long and uncertain legal process in fair
use cases, which can lead to overdeterrence).
154
See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating
that the test for infringement of a copyright is necessarily “vague” and determinations must be made “ad
hoc”). For scholarly criticism of the open ended nature of the standard of improper appropriation see
Cohen, supra note 148, at 741–44 (“There is no objective framework for defining how much copying is
too much.”); Lape, supra note 148, at 190–94 (discussing the difficulties associated with an amorphous
standard); Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010) (discussing the different approaches to the substantial similarity test);
Jarrod M. Mohler, Toward a Better Understanding of Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement
Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 971, 988–89 (2000) (arguing that a single overarching test would further
interests in consistency); see also Tushnet, supra note 150, at 716–17 (“The substantial similarity test is
notoriously confusing and confused, perplexing students and courts alike.”).
155
See Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1905–07 (2018)
(describing how substantial similarity is one of the most difficult questions in copyright law).
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and the requirement of improper appropriation.
This objection also fails to give sufficient attention to the specific focus
of the relevant doctrines and how they function in practice. While improper
appropriation can be as unpredictable as fair use, at least in an important
subset of the cases, a robust version of the doctrine is superior in generating
more certainty ex ante and a simpler process ex post. Those are cases in
which the conclusion that finding the uses infringing would impose
substantial cost on future creation for little added marginal incentive can be
reached relatively easily on the basis of limited information restricted to
comparison of the two works and minimal context about them.156 The reason
why there is a significant subset of such cases is the unitary, narrow focus
of improper appropriation on such comparisons.
Recall that, in contrast, fair use is a multi-focal doctrine that concerns
itself not only with how an alleged infringing work compares to copyrighted
material, but also considers factors such as the purpose and market effect of
alleged infringement.157 Fair use covers many different categories of
circumstances under which a use should be deemed non-infringing for any
of a variety of reasons.158 This capaciousness accounts for both the power
and weakness of fair use. By contrast, improper appropriation is much more
focused. The doctrine is designed to locate cases where, on the basis of
comparison of the expressive content of two works and relatively minimal
contextual information, it is possible to make a sound assessment that the
cost of including the relevant secondary use within the exclusionary property
right substantially outweighs its marginal incentive benefit.159
Consider for example Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting
Companies,160 in which the character of Ralph Hinkley of the television
show “The Greatest American Hero” was claimed to infringe the copyright
in the character of Superman.161 Given the concept of the show as “what
happens when you [the average person] become Superman,”162 it is
unsurprising that the character of Hinkley had many traits reminiscent or
evocative of Superman. In essence, however, Hinkley is an ordinary school

156
See, e.g., Nelson v. PRN Prods., Inc., 873 F.2d 1141, 1143–44 (8th Cir. 1989); Folio
Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991); Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d
1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018).
157
See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing the four statutory factors courts use when
considering the fair use doctrine).
158
See Joseph P. Liu, Fair Use, Notice Failure, and the Limits of Copyright as Property, 96 B.U.
L. REV. 833, 837 (2016) (“As a contextual, multifactor standard, the fair use defense contains within it,
inherently, a degree of uncertainty . . . .”).
159
See discussion supra Part II, Section B (discussing the scope of inappropriate appropriation and
its role in modern copyright law).
160
720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
161
Id. at 235.
162
Id. at 236.
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teacher who is forced reluctantly into superhero status. He uses his powers
clumsily due to the loss of the instruction book, which is the antithesis of
Superman.164 Recognizing this, the court of appeals in Warner Bros. upheld
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant due to the lack
of substantial similarity, concluding, “[i]n the genre of superheroes, Hinkley
follows Superman as, in the genre of detectives, Inspector Clouseau follows
Sherlock Holmes.”165
Could the same outcome have been reached on the basis of fair use?
Probably. Indeed, the decision briefly discusses fair use doctrine but does
not pursue it as a basis for non-liability.166 The point is that a fair use analysis
in this case would have been more complex, costly, and open to unexpected
twists and turns. The improper appropriation analysis required comparing
the expressive content of the two works and the material difference in their
meaning, notwithstanding the technical similarities.167 This relatively simple
analysis served as a good proxy for the underlying policy question about the
likely incentivizing effects of extending copyright protection to such uses,
both on incentives to create original characters such as Superman and on
subsequent creativity by others who wished to draw on established
characters and their dominant cultural significance. Crucially, the analysis
did not require a taxing process of discovery and fact finding.168
In light of later developments in fair use case law, especially the rise in
importance of the question of the transformative character of a secondary
use,169 there is a good chance that today, the defendant in a case such as
Warner Bros., would win on the basis of fair use. Still, the analysis would
have to run through multiple tricky questions such as: (1) the weight to be
imputed to the commercial nature of the use;170 (2) whether and the extent
163

Id.
Id.
165
Id. at 243.
166
Id. at 242–43.
167
Id. at 243.
168
See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“When a court is called upon to consider whether the works are substantially similar, no discovery or
fact-finding is typically necessary.”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, § 12.10[B](3) (“[T]he works
themselves supersede and control any contrary allegations, conclusions, or descriptions of the works
contained in the pleadings.”).
169
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994) (“[W]hether ‘a substantial
portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim’ from the copyrighted work is a relevant question for
it may reveal a dearth of transformative character . . . .”) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S., 565 (1985)); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–07 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing
transformative use and how it is critical to consider what a reasonable observer would say about a
particular work, not just what an artist might say); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd.,
448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the defendant was using the plaintiff’s images for a
transformative use).
170
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 921–22 (2d
Cir. 1994).
164

278

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:2

to which the use could be considered transformative or even parodic;171
(3) the amount and substantiality of the material taken in relation to the
purpose of the use;172 and (4) the likely market effect on profits from the
original in light of lack of an apparent market failure in negotiating a license
on the one hand173 and the possible transformative character of the use on
the other.174 Each of these questions could precipitate not only legal
argument, but also demands for discovery and fact finding,175 with the
asserter of the affirmative defense of fair use bearing the burden of
establishing a basis for favorable conclusions on factors such as market
effect.176 Hence, even where fair use analysis would lead to the same noliability conclusion as a robust improper appropriation requirement,
improper appropriation doctrine can provide a much more effective, less
costly way of securing social interests in activities that only partially draw
on expression in preexisting works.
The narrower focus of improper appropriation does not mean that there
will be no hard cases. It does mean, however, that there will be a core set of
cases where the application of a robust version of this doctrine should be a
relatively simple and certain way of determining non-liability, whereas fair
use will at best offer only a tortuous and, for many parties, overly uncertain
path to the same end. As a result, there will be an important set of cases
where a robust improper appropriation requirement can more cheaply and
171

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579–81. Compare Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 608–12 (finding
use of concert posters in a biographical book to be transformative), and Suntrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269–71 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding the extensive use of materials from
original novel to be transformative and parodic), with Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256–63
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding the use of materials from original novel neither parodic nor highly
transformative), vacated, 606 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010), and TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d
168, 180–82 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding the use of a comedy routine in a play not transformative).
172
17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–89.
173
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012); see Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930 (noting that only
“traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets” are to be considered under the fourth fair use
factor). In Warner Bros., there was no market failure in a conventional sense because prior to the
unauthorized use the parties engaged in licensing negotiations. See Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos.,
720 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting ABC’s failure in obtaining a production license for a television
series about “Superboy,” a series based on the early adventures of Superman).
174
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (“[W]hen . . . the second use is transformative . . . market harm
may not be so readily inferred.”); see also Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614 (explaining that
licensing markets for transformative uses are not considered under the fourth fair use factor even if
already established).
175
Demonstrative of this point is the fact that in Campbell, which is seen as a strong pro-fair-use
decision, the Supreme Court refrained from deciding the issue on the merits and remanded the case to
the trial court with instructions for further proceedings, presumptively to include further fact finding, on
the issues of the substantiality of the copyrighted material taken and the effect on the relevant secondary
market. 510 U.S. at 593–94. An appellate court may decide fair use as a matter of law only when the trial
court “has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors.” Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
176
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (describing the evidentiary presumption applied by the Court of
Appeals).
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predictably shield beneficial secondary uses, and thus more effectively serve
the aims of underlying copyright policy.
The substantive superiority of improper appropriation for an important
set of cases is boosted by procedural aspects of litigation.177 As indicated by
concerns with litigation costs highlighted in Section I.A, whether a legal rule
can effectively shield desirable secondary uses of copyrighted works does
not just depend on the substantive result generated by the rule post-litigation
or even the predictability of that result. Restricting vindication of a privilege
to use to a procedural route requiring long and expensive litigation increases
the risk of undesirable chilling effects on secondary uses.178 Conversely, a
simpler and more accessible path for vindicating the privilege is likely to
both boost the willingness of users to take the risk and even decrease threats
from copyright holders issued in the shadow of litigation.179
Summary judgment can act as a key mechanism here by enabling a user
to obtain vindication of its privilege to use without the need for a full trial.
Courts have shown some willingness to grant summary judgment to
defendants on the basis of findings of fair use in the appropriate cases.180
Nonetheless, by providing a route to decisions that rely on a more focused
inquiry than fair use, a robust improper appropriation doctrine makes
summary judgment in favor of a secondary user significantly easier for a
court to grant in an important subset of cases.181 This feature of the improper
appropriation doctrine is bolstered by the fact that, unlike fair use, improper
appropriation is an element of the prima facie case for which the burden of
177

For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Bracha, supra note 141.
See supra text accompanying note 116 (discussing the problem of overdeterrence in copyright).
179
See Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1781, 1810–15 (2010) (describing how easier vindication of fair use through reassignment of the burden
of proof is likely to reduce self-censorship of users).
180
See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that courts have
resolved fair use determinations at the summary judgment stage); Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v.
Network Prods. Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th Cir. 1990) (concluding that plaintiff’s copyright
infringement claim warranted summary judgment because defendant’s affirmative defense of fair use
was unsupported); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the parody song in
question is deserving of fair-use protection as a matter of law); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
103, § 12.10[B][4]. For a discussion of the rules pertaining to summary judgment and fair use, see Ned
Snow, Fair Use as a Matter of Law, 89 DENV. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011).
181
See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 918 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[W]here both the
plaintiff's and defendant's works are before the court, ‘the court may compare the two works and render
a judgment for the defendant on the ground that as a matter of law a trier of fact would not be permitted
to find substantial similarity.’” (citation omitted)); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 82 F. Supp. 3d 650, 653
n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Upon review of the works themselves, if the court concludes that no trier of fact
could rationally determine the two to be substantially similar, it can render a defense judgment as a matter
of law.”); Wavelength Film Co. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 305, 307–08 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (concluding that no reasonable jury could find the two disputed films to be substantially similar);
Anderson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1, 3 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that there was no
genuine issue that defendants infringed plaintiff’s copyright); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
103, §12.10[B][3].
178
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proof is on the plaintiff. For example, the Warner Bros. case discussed
above was decided by summary judgment on the basis of a comparison of
the original and allegedly infringing works with little resort to other factual
concerns.183 Consider also the case of Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc.,184
where the trial court granted summary judgment rejecting an infringement
claim by an author against the producers and screenwriter of a motion
picture that was allegedly based on the author’s book.185 The court reached
its decision after analyzing the two works on the basis of a thin version of
stipulated facts agreed to by the parties for purposes of the motion,186 as well
as expert opinions analyzing the works.187
This divergence between the general scope and evidentiary demands of
inquiries into improper appropriation and fair use is even more important in
relation to prospects for terminating a meritless case even earlier through a
motion to dismiss.188 Unlike fair use, improper appropriation is part of the
prima facie case of copyright infringement that a plaintiff must establish.189
This is important in light of two other factors: (1) the current pleading
burden requiring a complaint in a civil case to plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief,190 and (2) the willingness of some courts to grant
motions to dismiss in copyright cases due to failure to establish improper
appropriation.191 Together, these factors mean that courts can dismiss weak
infringement claims at a very early stage—even prior to discovery—on the
basis of the pleadings and a comparison of the expressive content of the

182
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, § 13.01[B]. Courts demand more from a party seeking
summary judgment on the basis of a claim for which that party bears the burden of proof in trial. See 10A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2727.1 (4th ed. 2010) (“Rule 56 first imposes a burden of production on the moving party
to make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment.”).
183
Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1190–95 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (comparing the
original and allegedly infringing works through a factual analysis).
184
615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986).
185
Id. at 432–33.
186
See id. at 433 n.1 (noting that the facts were provided to the court through statements submitted
by the parties).
187
Id. at 438; Walker, 784 F.2d at 47–48.
188
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
189
See supra note 182 and accompanying text (explaining that the burden of production is first
imposed on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment).
190
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (holding that a complaint requires
allegations “plausibly suggesting” a valid claim).
191
See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010)
(noting that the court may determine noninfringement on a motion to dismiss when the similarity
concerns only noncopyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s work or when no reasonable trier of fact could
find the works substantially similar); Nelson v. PRN Prods., Inc., 873 F.2d 1141, 1143–44 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that it
failed to state a claim for infringing use); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, § 12.10[B][3]
(discussing how common stock with a particular expressive genre do not receive copyright protection).
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192

works in the record. This avenue for prompt dismissal, which hardly
seems available under fair use,193 bolsters the improper appropriation
doctrine’s capacity—and differential capacity compared to fair use—to
discourage, or otherwise lead to early disposal of, especially dubious claims
of copyright infringement.194
The provision of a relatively fast and cheap way of dismissing meritless
infringement suits is of particular importance when one widens the
normative lens beyond economic efficiency. As a field regulating and
shaping expressive activities, copyright is of concern to several normative
theories focused on self-determination, the democratic public-sphere, or
human flourishing.195 For our purposes, the crucial, common feature of these
192

See, e.g., Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming a grant
of a motion to dismiss for lack of improper appropriation and concluding that “[n]othing disclosed during
discovery could alter the fact that the allegedly infringing works are as a matter of law not substantially
similar” to the plaintiff’s work); Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 64 (“[N]o discovery or fact-finding is
typically necessary, because ‘what is required is only a visual comparison of the works.’”) (citing Folio
Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991)).
193
See, e.g., Nelson, 873 F.2d at 1144 (affirming the trial court’s decision to grant motion to dismiss
without allowing further discovery because additional information was relevant for refuting a fair use
defense but not for substantial similarity).
194
An additional possible source of support for the need of a readily available mechanism for
dismissal of meritless copyright suits is the phenomenon colloquially referred to as “copyright trolls.”
These are entities in the business of enforcing copyrights in which they acquire an interest. Allegedly,
this activity often exploits various aspects of copyright law in order to extract settlement payments even
when the legal claim is dubious, which had been traditionally under-enforced or is of limited economic
impact. In recent years, copyright scholarship has started taking note of this phenomenon. See, e.g.,
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 728–29
(2013) (arguing that the delegation of copyright enforcement is troublesome because it disrupts the
balance of copyright claims that otherwise would have been tolerated); James DeBriyn, Shedding Light
on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19
UCLA ENTM’T. L. REV. 79, 86–90 (2012) (discussing the different business models of copyright trolling
throughout the last century); Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85
COLO. L. REV. 53, 53 (2014) (explaining that the fair use doctrine is copyright law’s internal limitation
on the enforcement-only business model of “copyright trolling”); Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An
Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2015) (analyzing the correlation between copyright
trolling and the growth of multi-defendant John Doe litigation over the past decade); Samuelson, supra
note 1, at 759 (discussing how copyright trolls likely generate litigation disproportionate to the harm
caused). Courts too have started referring to copyright trolls in their decisions. See, e.g., Brownmark
Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that the plaintiff had “the
appearance of a ‘copyright troll’”); Third Degree Films v. Does 1–47, 286 F.R.D. 188, 189 (D. Mass.
2012) (“[T]his Court has grown increasingly troubled by ‘copyright trolling . . . .’”). There is, however,
considerable disagreement on the extent and character of the phenomenon as well as its evaluation. See
Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Jonah B. Gelbach, Debunking the Myth of the Copyright Troll Apocalypse,
101 IOWA L. REV. 43, 44 (2016) (analyzing empirical observations about the phenomenon of copyright
trolling). Note that the case for the importance of an efficient mechanism for the early and cheap dismissal
of meritless copyright lawsuits does not hinge on the anti-copyright-trolls argument, but is only bolstered
by it.
195
See Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of
Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 249–58 (2014) (discussing various theories for normative
analysis of copyright).
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theories is that, in evaluating copyright’s institutional design, they all go
beyond strict comparison of positive and negative individual welfare effects.
Each of these normative frameworks, for its own reasons, places a premium
on a robust freedom to engage in secondary uses of copyrighted works.196
Each also takes an interest not just in a bottom line for overall social welfare,
but also in questions of which members of society get to engage in which
kinds of expressive activities.197 Because these theories are interested in
broad and diverse access to secondary uses for creative purposes
(“secondary creation”), they provide strong justifications for improper
appropriation’s procedural advantages. As discussed above in relation to fair
use,198 the chilling effect of dubious claims is, in practical effect, borne
unequally by different secondary creators depending on their sophistication
and financial backing.199 Hence, by providing greater opportunities for quick
and cheap dismissal of such claims, improper appropriation doctrine is likely
to reduce differential chilling effects and thus to increase both the number
and diversity of actors who engage in secondary creation.
An additional counter-argument to the anti-redundancy objection is
focused not on the superiority of improper appropriation over fair use in
shielding certain secondary uses, but on the beneficial character of the
overlap between the two. A doctrinal structure that includes both doctrines
more robustly enables secondary uses because it creates a double barrier for
liability. To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must both establish
improper appropriation and survive any assertion of a fair use defense. A
defendant can prevail by either a plaintiff’s failure to establish improper
appropriation or a successful fair use defense. One may be tempted to say
that redundancy functions here as an error-check: a court that gets wrong the
application of one of the doctrines can still get to the right outcome under
the other. This is true, but only if the correct result is no liability. When the
correct result is infringement—a result that requires sub-results under both
doctrines to point in this direction—the double barrier can be expected to
increase the risk of error rather than reduce it. Hence, part of the overall
policymaking question becomes whether we should be more worried about
“Type I” errors that improperly subject secondary uses to copyright
liability—false positives—or “Type II” errors that improperly excuse such
196
See id. at 251–58 (describing four normative theories of copyright and analyzing how each
engages with expression).
197
Id. at 258–87.
198
See supra notes 116–130 and accompanying text (discussing the chilling effect of uncertainty in
application of the fair use defense).
199
See Liu, supra note 116, at 434 (“[A] chilling effect may result from the often significant
economic disparity between copyright owners and those who seek to build upon pre-existing works.”);
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1566 (2005)
(“‘Get a license or do not sample’ is no answer to a would-be creator who does not have the money to
participate in the license marketplace.”).
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secondary uses—false negatives. At least at the level of a first-order
analysis, the layering of a meaningful improper appropriation doctrine on
top of a background defense of fair use favors avoiding Type I errors at the
risk of increasing Type II errors.
Why might we want such an asymmetric structure of redundancy? One
possible justification is that such a structure helps ensure that copyright law
properly respects interests in freedom of speech. It is widely recognized that
copyright and free speech have a natural tendency to conflict.200 By
definition, copyright imposes limitations on speech that are backed by legal
sanctions and remedies. Relative to the value of such limitations in
promoting creative speech,201 the resulting discouragement of certain forms
of speech and potential depopulation of the “marketplace of ideas”202 may
be viewed as particularly, although not exclusively,203 problematic in cases
where there exist significant substantial similarity questions—in other
words, cases where the user’s expression materially differs from mere
copying or repetition of another’s speech.204 Even more to the point with
respect to redundancy, freedom of speech concerns are likely to be
significant in cases implicating the doctrinal layering of an improper
appropriation requirement and a fair use defense because these cases
typically involve substantial transformation of original expression.205
Courts and commentators often dismiss concerns about tension between
200

See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 892
(2002) (“A legislative grant of this private power to stop speech on the basis of its content is in overt
tension with the constitutional guarantees of speech and press freedom.”); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright
and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 284
(1979) (”Even a cursory examination of the origins of copyright law reveals the potential conflict
between property rights in intellectual creations and freedom of expression.”); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (“Copyright’s
speech encumbrance cuts a wide swath . . . .”); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1181 (1970) (posing the
question of whether the Copyright Act “abridges the ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘of the press’ in that it
punishes expressions by speech and press when such expressions consist of the unauthorized use of
material protected by copyright” ).
201
See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (“Because copyright law ultimately serves
the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important
that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible.”).
202
Cf. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 829 (2008)
(“Holmes’s invocation of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor, though it came in a dissent, has had as
major an impact as any Supreme Court decision on popular and academic thinking about the First
Amendment.”).
203
See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 565 (2004) (“Audiences benefit from copied as well as original
expressions.”).
204
Cf. id. at 550 (discussing the view that transformative uses “that add[] value to the original
br[ing] something new and creative into the world, so they might be justified [relative to copyright law’s
purposes] even if the copyright owner objected”).
205
Netanel, supra note 111, at 736 (“[F]air use doctrine today is overwhelmingly dominated by the
Leval-Campbell transformative use doctrine.”).
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copyright and freedom of speech by observing that copyright incorporates
internal mechanisms, such as the fair use doctrine and the rule that ideas are
not copyrightable, which balance speech interests with those served by
copyright.206 But doctrinal balancing of speech interests in principle does not
necessarily translate into effective protection of those interests “in action.”207
An overlap between the fair use doctrine and the requirement of improper
appropriation, with the greater practical opportunities for expeditious
adjudication that this overlap affords, is one way of helping ensure that
copyright indeed takes free speech rights seriously.208 Under this view, a
somewhat lopsided doctrinal design in favor of preventing errors in findings
of liability is a feature, not a bug.
Particularly in cases where a user of copyrighted material has added new
expressive content, double-layered protection of the user’s freedom of
speech can make perfect sense. Limiting false positives in the form of
findings of liability can be viewed as more important than limiting false
negatives in the form of failures to find liability when a fundamental interest
in free speech is aligned with the former goal. This justification of the
redundant structure of fair use and improper appropriation fits a long
tradition of procedural safeguards for speech209 and of limiting the reach of
206
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (stating that “copyright’s built-in free speech
safeguards are generally adequate to address” First Amendment concerns); Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555–60 (1985) (declining to expand “the doctrine of fair use to
create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright”); New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry
Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989) (asserting that the Second Circuit’s prior “observation that
the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of first amendment in the copyright field never has been
repudiated” (internal citation omitted)); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) (arguing that the idea/expression dichotomy accommodates
competing copyright and First Amendment interests). This argument is usually traced to Nimmer, supra
note 200, at 1181. The built-in speech balancing mechanisms commonly highlighted are the
idea/expression dichotomy, the fair use doctrine, and copyright’s limited duration.
207
See David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 1393, 1413 (2009) (“[D]ue to the significant changes to the traditional contours of copyright . . .
the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrines cannot come close to adequately protecting the
public’s interests in speech . . . .”); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12,
36 (1910) (“It is the work of lawyers to make the law in action conform to the law in the books . . . by
making the law in the books such that the law in action can conform to it, and providing a speedy, cheap
and efficient legal mode of applying it.”); see also Netanel, supra note 200, at 26 (“[I]t is highly—and
increasingly—doubtful that copyright limitations adequately protect First Amendment values.”);
Tushnet, supra note 203, at 554 (“[F]air use, with its balancing apparatus, is ill suited to protecting
activities that are at the core of ordinary uses of copyrighted works; it is supposed to deal with unusual
or marginal activities.”).
208
Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 186 (1977) (“If we cannot insist that the
Government reach the right answers about the rights of its citizens, we can insist at least that it try.”).
209
See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 150 (1998) (discussing “the ‘First Amendment due process’” in the
context of prior restraint as applied to copyright); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of
Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2465 (1998)
(“‘[R]igorous procedural safeguards’ are needed because ‘the freedoms of expression must be ringed
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private law doctrines to accommodate free speech interests. Bracketing
the question of whether this doctrinal structure can immunize copyright from
First Amendment challenges in any particular case, the one-sided
redundancy seems an important mechanism for erring on the side of caution
when deciding whether to burden speech with copyright liability.
C. Copyrightable Subject Matter and Originality
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act provides that copyright “subsists,
in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship.”211 On its face,
this section sets forth two requirements for copyrightable subject matter: (1)
it must be a “work[] of authorship”; and (2) it must be original.212 As
indicated in Section II.A,213 § 102(b) adds a further set of limitations by
explicitly excluding from coverage “any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”214 The Act does not
expressly define “works of authorship,” but § 102(a) does provide a nonexhaustive list of eight categories.215 Copyright’s originality requirement,
for its part, is commonly understood to require independent creation by the
author216 and “more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.”217
The net result of this doctrinal structure is partial overlap between three
operative parts: (1) originality; (2) the general copyrightable subject-matter
requirement; and (3) express subject-matter exclusions. Tricky questions
can result when a decision-maker has to assess the copyrightability of
subject matter that is at best a poor fit for the statute’s illustrative categories.
The statute’s apparent use of “original” as a limiting modifier for the
separate term “works of authorship” suggests that Congress envisioned the
originality and subject-matter requirements as imposing distinguishable
limitations.218
about with adequate bulwarks.’” (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963))); Martin
H. Redish & Kristin McCall, Due Process, Free Expression, and the Administrative State 42 (Nw. Law
& Econ. Research Paper No. 18–03, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3122697 (justifying “the special
status of First Amendment due process,” as opposed to due process in cases that “involve solely property
rights,” partly because of “the special status of free expression in our system of constitutional liberties.”).
210
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964) (“We hold today that the
Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials
against critics of their official conduct.”).
211
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
212
Id.
213
See supra Section II.A (exploring limitations imposed by § 102(b)).
214
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
215
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, § 2.03[A] (discussing
the meaning of the phrase “works of authorship” in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) by pointing to the statutory
language and a related congressional report).
216
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, § 2.01[A][1] (stating that an original work is one that
is the “product of the independent efforts of its author”).
217
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
218
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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Nonetheless, courts sometimes reduce the analysis to an inquiry into
originality and marginalize or ignore altogether the independent question of
whether relevant subject matter is a work of authorship within the statutory
ambit. An example of this reductive approach is the 2005 decision in Open
Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury.219 In this case, the district court assessed
the copyrightability of a sequence of yoga poses and, in so doing, appeared
to collapse both § 102(a)’s “work of authorship” requirement and § 102(b)’s
exclusions into the originality requirement.220 The court responded to the
plaintiff’s argument that the yoga poses were “merely uncopyrightable
functional physical movements” by holding that “if the trier of fact
determines that a sufficient number of the individual yoga asanas are
arranged in a sufficiently creative manner, copyright protection for the yoga
sequence would be available.”221 Thus, the originality analysis completely
swallowed any independent analysis of whether the yoga sequences
qualified as a “work of authorship” and whether they were excluded as a
functional “procedure.”222 In this way, the district court perhaps
unintentionally adopted a position analogous to that of patent law
commentators who contend that the patentability of a claimed invention
should turn essentially entirely on requirements of utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and adequacy of the patent’s written description, with any
inquiry into the patent-eligibility of the claimed invention’s subject matter
being no more than trivial.223
The Copyright Office has taken a different view. First, the Office has
stated that originality does not establish subject-matter eligibility; according
to the Office, “a creative selection, coordination, or arrangement must also
result in one or more congressionally recognized categories of
authorship.”224 Second, the Office has taken the more controversial225 step
219
220

74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1434 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
Id. at 1436–38 (providing the court’s analysis of “Copyright Validity” of a sequence of yoga

asanas).
221

Id. at 1437-38
See id. at 1437 (stating that issue of originality is the “backdrop” against which the claims “must
be evaluated”).
223
See, e.g., Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 591 (2008) (proposing
a rule governing how to determine the patentability of an invention).
224
Registration of Claims to Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,605, 37,606 (June 22, 2012) [hereinafter
Statement of Policy] (emphasis omitted) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
225
There is a plausible argument that the § 102(a) categories are illustrative and leave the door open
for judicial recognition of other works of authorship. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, § 2.03[A]
(noting that it is “clear that ‘works of authorship’ are not necessarily limited to the eight broad categories
of works listed under Section 102(a)” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)); R. Anthony Reese,
Copyrightable Subject Matter in the “Next Great Copyright Act,” 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1489, 1499
(2014) (observing that “the statutory term ‘works of authorship’ can include works that do not fall within
any of the categories enumerated in section 102(a),” but recommending as a reform that “the statute
should expressly enumerate all of the categories of works to which Congress chooses to grantcopyright
protection and should not extend protection to an open-ended and undefined category of works.”);
222
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of contending that neither the courts nor the Office may recognize “new
categories of authorship” beyond the forms explicitly listed in the Act.226 On
this basis, the Copyright Office has rejected “the copyrightability of the
selection and arrangement of preexisting exercises, such as yoga poses,”
except to the extent that such a compilation fits at least one of the statutorily
listed categories.227 For example, a sequence of asanas would qualify as a
work of “choreographic authorship” if “it contains sufficient attributes of a
work of choreography” rising beyond the level of “‘social dance steps and
simple routines’” that legislative history indicates Congress meant to
exclude from copyrightability.228 But unless the sequence fits this or another
statutory category, it cannot be protected.229
A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit addressed the same sequences of
yoga poses as Open Source but took a third route.230 In Bikram’s Yoga
College of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, L.L.C., the court emphasized that
passing the originality bar is a distinct matter from surviving the § 102(b)
exclusion of functional subject matter.231 The court then determined that the
asana was functional and therefore uncopyrightable because of health and
psychological benefits touted by its creator.232 This outcome, the court
concluded, made it unnecessary to examine the separate § 102(a)
challenge.233
How should these three doctrines work together? Are some of them
superfluous in light of the others? Should courts, like that in Open Source,
treat originality as effectively the test for whether there is a copyrightable
work of authorship? Should the § 102(b) exclusion of nonfunctional subject
matter be considered avoided whenever some aspect of a work satisfies the
§ 102(a) requirement of originality?234 No doubt, in many cases where
Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 17, 17 (2016)
(observing that un-enumerated categories of “other types of intellectual creations may be eligible for
protection as long as they satisfy copyright’s originality and fixation requirements”).
226
Statement of Policy, supra note 224, at 37,607.
227
Id.
228
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54 (1976)).
229
Id. at 37, 607.
230
Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, L.L.C., 803 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.
2015).
231
See id. at 1038 (noting a court’s prior explanation that certain “‘processes , even if original,
cannot be protected by copyright’” (quoting Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2002))).
232
Id. at 1040 (“[B]eauty is not a basis for copyright protection.”); see also PATRY, supra note 52,
§ 4.22 (arguing that yoga sequences cannot be protected by copyright when functional).
233
Bikram’s Yoga, 803 F.3d at 1043 (“In this case, we need not decide whether to adopt the
Copyright Office’s definition of ‘choreographic work’ or fashion another on our own . . . .”).
234
This way of avoiding the § 102(b) exclusions might be considered comparable to the European
prohibition of patenting business methods being avoided when an applicant establishes that the claimed
business method has “technical effect” and thus that the patent is not seeking to cover a bare business
method per se. See Rajnish Kumar Rai & Srinath Jagannathan, Do Business Method Patents Encourage
Innovation?, 2012 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 6 (“[E]ven though the European patent system is
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subject matter qualification under either subsection of § 102 is doubtful, the
relevant work may also fail the originality bar. We believe, however, that
even if there is some overlap between copyright’s subject matter
requirements and the originality threshold, it makes substantial policy sense
to have meaningful subject matter requirements that are separate and
independent of copyright’s originality threshold. Both § 102(a) and § 102(b)
have distinct functions that are far from superfluous.
Consider first the particular relationship between originality and the
§ 102(b) exclusion of functional subject matter. Copyright law includes
various features, such as a (roughly) century-long copyright term and lax
substantive and procedural thresholds for obtaining rights,235 that, from the
standpoint of promoting social welfare, are plausibly a much better fit for
some forms of subject matter than others. In the analogous case of patent
law, exclusion from patentability of laws of nature and abstract ideas—
however useful, novel, or nonobvious—can make sense because of concern
that the patenting of such scientific and technological building blocks can
create excessive bottlenecks for follow-on research and development.236
Similarly, some functional subject matter is a poor fit for copyright, although
perhaps sometimes a decent fit for patent. A new machine or a system for
calculating temperatures are not the kind of subject matter for which
copyright’s doctrinal features are designed. Whether they are protected and
what kind of protection they get should be a matter of patent law, which is
designed for this kind of subject matter. Thus, the § 102(b) exclusion of
functional subject matter serves as a first rough filter that improves the
tailoring of copyright’s coverage to its social ends and does so in a
reasonably administrable, or even administration-aiding, way. In other
words, § 102(b) serves as a channeling mechanism. It points relevant subject
matter to the legal regime appropriate for it on the basis of a rough
categorical classification.237
considered to be far more stringent . . . patent applications that describe the ‘technical effect’ of these
methods in addition to claiming abstract business methods can obtain protection under the European
Patent system.”).
235
See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1603, 1615–
16 (2017) (“When functional innovation infiltrates the copyright regime, copyright can override patent’s
limitations on both the ability to obtain rights and the length of protection.”).
236
See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041,
1069–74 (2011) (arguing that patents for “general scientific or mathematical ideas” will increase the
costs and decrease the incentives for innovation).
237
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (“To give to the author of the book an exclusive
property in the art described therein . . . is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright.”); Mark P.
McKenna & Christopher Jon Sprigman, What’s In, and What’s Out: How IP’s Boundary Rules Shape
Innovation, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 491, 531 (2017) (arguing that § 102(b) establishes boundaries
between copyright, patent, and the public domain); Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the
Boundaries of Copyright and Patent Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1496–1500 (2017)
(examining the constitutional and statutory reasons for drawing “sharp distinctions” between the domains
of copyright and patent); Buccafusco & Lemley supra note 38, at 1304 (observing that “[f]unctionality

2019]

REDUNDANCY AND ANTI-REDUNDANCY IN COPYRIGHT

289

The relationship between the originality requirement and § 102(b)
depends on the purposes served by the doctrines, which in turn should
inform how the doctrines are understood and applied. Of the two distinct
elements of the originality requirement—“independent creation” and a
quantum of creativity238—the first one, demanding that the protected subject
matter originate with the person claiming protection, is of little relevance
here. Opinions vary on the proper purpose of the second element of the
originality requirement, the requirement of a modicum of creativity of the
protected subject matter.239
The dominant justification for the very low creativity bar in existing law
is avoidance of cumbersome evidentiary inquiries in establishing copying.
According to this view, because originality imposes a threshold requirement
that copyrightable material be distinguishable from preexisting material,
courts are commonly spared the complicated task of figuring out whether
the similarity of an allegedly infringing work is attributable to copying from
the protected work or to both works having drawn on common sources.240
For others who advocate a more demanding originality threshold, one
that would require substantial revision of existing doctrine, the fundamental
justifications for the requirement tend to differ. These alternative
justifications include the following: (1) a better cost-benefit balance
achieved by restricting protection only to individual cases where the creative
contribution and hence the social benefit of the work are likely to be
significant;241 (2) avoiding wasteful rent dissipation due to the creation of
duplicative works seeking to capture valuable demand;242 and (3) ensuring
doctrines exist to prevent creators from characterizing things that belong in the utility patent realm as
being copyrightable”); Samuelson, supra note 48, at 1932 (analyzing the distinction between copyright
and patent drawn in Baker).
238
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (explaining that “originality
requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”).
239
To simplify the terminology, the analysis below may refer to this modicum-of-creativity element
of originality alternatively as “creativity” or “originality.”
240
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 90, 263 (2003) (“The main function of conditioning copyright protection
on a showing of some originality is . . . to lighten the evidentiary burden on the courts . . . .”). This
matters because only copying constitutes copyright infringement: a subsequent work cannot infringe
copyright in a preexisting one no matter how similar it is to it unless the similarity is attributable to having
copied from it. By reducing the possibility that an alleged infringer has merely coincidentally generated
a substantially similar work without copying aspects of the allegedly infringed work, the originality
requirement can help make the infringement inquiry more straightforward.
241
See, e.g., Ryan Littrell, Toward A Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright Law, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 193, 217 (2001) (arguing that it is uncertain whether the protection of “marginally original” works
furthers the policy goal of fostering art); Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
451, 464 (2009) (“[Unconventional expression] does more to advance knowledge and learning than does
pedestrian, convention-bound expression.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA.
L. REV. 1505, 1517 (2009) (“Naturally, only original works promote social welfare.”).
242
See Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive-Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation
& Copyright Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 1910–15 (2014) (“The most direct way of reducing
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the conditions for human flourishing in the cultural sphere by focusing
copyright protection on works with a creative aspect that makes them
particularly likely to enrich culture.243
Under any of these justifications for the originality requirement, either
the existing one or a revised version of it, the stated operational logic differs
from that of § 102(b). In all of these variants, originality serves a different
purpose from that of § 102(b) and specifies different desiderata, whether it
is novelty, innovation, or evidentiary distinguishability. As a result, one
might expect to see little redundancy or even overlap between the two
doctrines.
There is, however, another understanding of the existing low creativity
bar that construes it as having more overlap with § 102(b). Under this
understanding, a purpose of this minimal creativity requirement is to ensure
that copyright is only extended to the kind of subject matter for which this
regime is designed: subject matter that incorporates more than trivial
intellectual creation in the realm of communicative, expressive forms. Such
forms must be distinguished from the content of expression, such as facts or
ideas, and from functional aspects, all of which copyright does not target for
protection. By demanding some modicum of creativity in forms protected
by copyright, the originality requirement thus helps ensure, for example, that
protected matter does not have its nature determined entirely by functional
considerations that substantially override, if not obliterate, any sense of
individual creativity in the resulting “work.”
In accordance with this view, a key point is that copyright law is not just
about promoting newness or innovation per se, but instead is more
specifically about promoting relevant forms of communicative expression,
where, in this context, the word “forms” emphasizes the fact that copyright
does not look to protect functional matter or content, such as facts or ideas.
Requiring “creativity” means requiring more than trivial contribution in this
domain of expressive forms. One can view attention to this, more specific
aim of copyright as informing the Copyright Office’s approach to
understanding § 102(a) and the statutory phrase “work of authorship”: as
discussed earlier, in the Office’s view, for yoga sequences to qualify for
copyright protection as, works of “choreographic authorship,” they must not
only be “choreographic” but must reflect some creative or distinctively
expressive aspect beyond those characteristic of “social dance steps and
simple routines.”244 Likewise, the originality requirement and § 102(b) work
wasteful entry by new works . . . is to remove . . . the copyright protection that enables the capture of
such rents and thereby attracts duplicative entry.”).
243
See William W. Fisher III, Recalibrating Originality, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 437, 461–65 (2016)
(arguing that a higher originality threshold would protect works that add to cultural richness while freeing
derivative works for “incorporation, appropriation, or recoding”).
244
Supra text accompanying note 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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together to tailor copyright’s reach to the aim of promoting relevantly
creative expression.245
Because both the originality requirement and § 102(b) are meant to
prevent the extension of copyright to subject matter that is not in the domain
of relevantly creative expression, there should be little wonder that there is
substantial overlap in their application. There will be cases in which the
subject matter at issue is both excluded as functional under § 102(b) and
lacks the spark of creativity required for originality.246 In this zone of overlap
in outcomes, the value of redundancy between § 102(b) and the originality
requirement is mainly in providing alternative routes that can minimize
errors, a non-trivial benefit in an area where legal questions can seem opaque
or challenging for decision-makers.
Yet the overlap is not complete. There are cases where the creativity bar
of originality is, at least arguably, met but the relevant subject matter is still
excluded as functional. In Bikram’s Yoga, the Ninth Circuit illustrated this
phenomenon through examples of creative methods of brushing teeth,
mowing lawns, or drilling.247 And there are other cases where there are no
clear functionality problems under § 102(b), but nevertheless the claimed
subject matter fails the creativity test. This may happen either when after
deducting subject matter excluded by § 102(b) any remaining expressive
material is extremely thin248 or when, more generally, the relevant subject
matter does not fall within a § 102(b) category but includes no or little
creative expression of the nature that copyright is meant to protect.249
Under this understanding, § 102(b) and the originality requirement serve
a shared purpose even though there is only partial overlap between the two.
Both doctrines help ensure that copyright encompasses only expressive
forms for which it is designed. Section 102(b) achieves this by identifying
and excluding specific categories of subject matter outside this realm. The
originality requirement achieves this by focusing on a quality that cuts across
245

We thank Talha Syed for helping to sharpen this point.
See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537–542 (6th
Cir. 2004) (finding for purposes of a motion for a preliminary injunction that a short computer program
was ineligible for protection both because it failed to satisfy the originality requirement and because it
was functional due to its operation as a lockout code).
247
See Bikram’s Yoga, 803 F.3d at 1044 (presenting these examples).
248
Arguably this was the case in the seminal case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362-364 (1991) (ruling that the standard selection, coordination, and
arrangement of unprotectable factual information in a white pages directory did not satisfy the
requirement of a modicum of creativity); see also Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding that a combination of unprotectable elements in a glass in glass jellyfish sculpture fails the
originality requirement because the quantum of creativity “added in combining these standard and
stereotyped elements must be considered ‘trivial’ ”).
249
See, e.g., Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir.
2008) (ruling that barebones wire-frame computer models of cars fail the originality requirement because
they “reflect none of the decisions that can make depictions of things or facts in the world” protectable
by copyright).
246
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different subject-matter types—its reflection of a modicum of creativity.
Although there are some works for which the operation of the doctrines is
complementary, with only one doctrine presenting a substantial barrier to
copyrightability, the overall doctrinal structure is one of partial overlap in
which, for nontrivial sets of works, both doctrines present meaningful
hurdles, and the relatively minimalist creativity criterion functions as a
stopgap that supports the § 102(b) exclusions, helping to dispose of
copyrightability claims that might slip by the statutory exclusions but that
nonetheless are not the type of subject matter that copyright is properly
understood to cover. At least if one accepts the desirability of prioritizing
avoidance of excessive copyright coverage, there can be value in this
redundancy for works that hover around the borders of copyrightability and
thus seem especially liable to slip by one of the individual doctrinal barriers
even while being of dubious copyrightability under both.250
Hence, there seems a relatively easy case for value in retaining the
originality requirement and § 102(b) exclusions as partially overlapping
doctrines. Recognizing them as separate doctrines seems analytically useful,
facilitating a care and precision in analysis that themselves can limit errors
and promote the predictability and consistency of a legal regime’s operation.
At the same time, permitting the doctrines’ overlap helps ensure exclusion
from copyrightability in situations where the case for copyright protection
is, in a sense, doubly weak.
Once we have the benefit of both the originality requirement and the
§ 102(b) exclusions, however, is there any work left for a distinct
requirement of a “work of authorship”? We believe there is. The crucial
point here is that functionality and the associated § 102(b) categories fail to
capture all subject matter that should be categorically excluded from
copyright. What of asana sequences in which no health or psychological
benefit is asserted? What of sports moves, such as platform dives or
gymnastics routines? Some of these may not be easily described as
functional. Nor do they have a feature sometimes highlighted by courts as a
basis for denying copyright protection to sports events: being “unscripted”
and therefore authorless in the sense that the display does not follow a
pattern determined by a well-defined creator.251 Should this mean, as one
250
To the extent considering a work’s creativity separately could help prevent a decision maker
from failing to identify a subset of creative aspects that should not be refused copyrightability as a result
of the § 102(b) exclusions, the originality requirement’s separate focusing of attention on creativity could
also improve the operation of the copyright system in a way that, at least on occasion, favors would-be
copyright holders. But for simplicity, we focus in the main text on how the partially redundant filters of
§ 102(a), § 102(b), and the originality requirement help prevent erroneous findings of copyrightability,
rather than the extent the combination of these doctrines could help ensure that at least some aspects of
certain works receive some copyright protection.
251
See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Sports events
are not ‘authored’ in any common sense of the word.”).

2019]

REDUNDANCY AND ANTI-REDUNDANCY IN COPYRIGHT

293

commentator concludes, that such subject matter should generally be
protectable by copyright?252 Our sense is that answer is “No.”
There are multiple reasons to believe that copyright exclusions, even for
“original” subject matter, should extend beyond the functional and the noncreator-determined. In some areas of human ingenuity, there are sufficient
incentives for creation even without exclusionary rights and thus no reason
to incur the various costs of a proprietary regime.253 Consider the various
first-mover254 and reputational255 advantages available to the innovator in the
realm of sports moves or martial arts, where the innovations can provide a
competitive advantage and a distinctiveness from the crowd that enables an
early adopter win fame, fortune, or both.256 Similarly, consider the
252

See PATRY, supra note 52, § 4.21 (concluding that there is no bar for the protection of “certain
sports like figure skating or synchronized swimming routines . . . [i]f the other elements of originality
and fixation are present”).
253
See Samuelson supra note 225, at 55 (identifying as a central guideline for whether particular
subject matter should be included in copyright the inquiry of whether “copyright or copyright-like
protection is needed to induce investment in works of that kind.”).
254
First-mover or lead-time advantages are the advantages enjoyed by an innovator in a particular
field by virtue of being the first to innovate especially when that person enjoys a period of time before
others can catch up and emulate the innovation. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 384–85 (1973) (discussing lead-time advantages that can
enable innovators to “enjoy freedom from competitive innovation for a sufficiently long time to recoup
their original investment manyfold even without patent protection”); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case
for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV.
281, 300 (1970) (noting that, even at a time when the works of “many English writers” did not enjoy
copyright protection in the United States, “lead time was important enough that [they] earned more from
the sale of advance proofs to American publishers . . . than from the copyright royalties on their English
sales”).
255
Reputational advantages are the positive effects enjoyed by an innovator due to being known as
responsible for a particular innovation or series of innovations. See Glynn S. Lunney, Patent Law, the
Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 56–57 (2004)
(discussing how “a reputation for innovation [c]ould become both a source of rents for, and an informal
guarantee of, future innovation”); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE. L.J. 535, 541 (2004) (observing that some creators
“seek public accolades” or “want peer recognition”). Such positive effects could be “intrinsic” in the
sense of the satisfaction enjoyed by the innovator as a result of the reputation irrespective of monetizing
such reputation, or they could be pecuniary in the sense of leveraging the reputation into various forms
of monetary income. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 331 (1989) (discussing pecuniary and nonpecuniary advantages from the
“self-advertisement and self-promotion” gains of publishing); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s
Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 317, 343 (2011) (discussing pecuniary and nonpecuniary
advantages that creators can gain from “recognition”). An example of reputational effects in sports is
being known as the creator of a certain innovative element or even having the element named after the
creator, see infra note 256—reputational devices that can generate for the innovator both intrinsic
benefits and pecuniary income--for example, in the form of an increased demand for her coaching
services.
256
Cf. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 203 (6th ed. 2013) (noting that Dick Fosbury used his early advantage in “perfect[ing]
the back-first high-jump technique now known as the ‘Fosbury Flop’ . . . to set an Olympic record and
win the gold medal in the 1968 Olympics”).
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alternative sources of motivation and compensation available to the
organizers of a parade,258 the creator of a culinary dish,259 or the designer of
a new perfume fragrance.260
More fundamentally, in some areas, proprietary rights may be corrosive
of the very value of the human activities and relationships at stake. Sport is
a good example. As one court put it, “[e]ven where athletic preparation most
resembles authorship—figure skating, gymnastics, and, some would
uncharitably say, professional wrestling—a performer who conceives and
executes a particularly graceful and difficult—or, in the case of wrestling,
seemingly painful—acrobatic feat cannot copyright it without impairing the
underlying competition in the future. A claim of being the only athlete to
perform a feat doesn’t mean much if no one else is allowed to try.”261
Hence, by providing grounds for defining what lies within the bounds
of the copyrightable, § 102(a) is itself a means for rough categorical
exclusions distinct from those prescribed by Congress in § 102(b), such as
the exclusion based on functionality.262 Notably, § 102(a) embodies a
distinctive congressional strategy for limiting copyright protection to
appropriate matter—namely and in part, listing categories of matter that
characteristically falls within copyright’s proper realm. More specifically,
§ 102(a) creates a division of labor between Congress and the courts in the
deployment of this additional filter. Congress assumes the primary
responsibility for designating areas of subject matter deemed suitable and
257
See Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
501, 546–48 (2012) (arguing that, although various innovations in fields such as movement, tactile or
ergonomic products, and culinary dishes can have nonfunctional elements, it may be desirable to deny
them copyright protection because of the existence of sufficient independent sources of motivation and
incentives).
258
See Prod. Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Cont’l Broad. Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500, 1504 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(concluding that a parade, as opposed to an audiovisual depiction of the parade, is “not a work of
authorship entitled to copyright protection”).
259
Courts routinely deny copyright protection to new culinary creations. They often do it by finding
a new recipe to be functional. See, e.g., Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir.
1996) (denying copyright protection to yogurt recipes because they were found to be functional under
§ 102(b)). Some courts, however, have relied on a different reason that a new culinary creation is not
encompassed by any § 102(a) subject matter category, thereby implying that even possibly nonfunctional
elements of culinary creations are not entitled to copyright protection. See, e.g., Lorenzana v. S. Am.
Rests. Corp., 799 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2015) (denying copyright protection to a chicken sandwich because
it was found not to fit “any of the eligible categories”).
260
See Charles Cronin, Genius in a Bottle: Perfume, Copyright, and Human Perception, 56 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y. U.S.A 427, 471 (2009) (positing that, “like the products of the closely related apparel
industry, perfume is a ‘solidarity good’” and thus can be produced “profitabl[y] and innovative[ly]”
despite only limited patent, trademark, and trade secret protection).
261
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997).
262
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, § 2.03[A] (observing that “the concept ‘works of
authorship’ is intentionally left vague under the Act” and that “courts are thereby permitted, but not
required, to recognize as protectable types of works not expressly included in the category enumeration
set forth in the statute”).
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therefore eligible for copyright protection through explicitly specified
subject matter subcategories.263 Courts are given secondary responsibility
that they exercise in two ways. First, courts decide through interpretation
whether borderline cases fall within the categories enumerated by Congress,
their reserved discretion to make such determinations providing for
flexibility in calibration of copyright’s subject-matter coverage. 264 Second,
courts are left to make judgments on the suitability for copyright protection
of forms of human creation outside the enumerated subject-matter categories
: courts make such judgments in deciding whether such matter properly falls
within the residual area that lies outside the enumerated categories but
nonetheless inside the overarching category of “works of authorship.”265
These judgments can proceed by analogy to existing recognized categories,
thus giving the statutory list of explicit inclusions another significant
purpose.266 Of course, one can also give § 102(a)’s subject matter
requirement significant, independent meaning by adopting the Copyright
Office’s strict and static view of subcategories of copyrightable subject
matter, thus limiting the court’s responsibility to managing and interpreting
enumerated subject matter categories.267 Whether one adopts this restrictive
view or a broader, more flexible understanding of § 102(a), however, the
work-of-authorship requirement can and should function as yet another
preliminary filter to enable the exclusion of subject matter that is
inappropriate for copyright.
In sum, originality, § 102(a) subject matter requirements, and § 102(b)
263
E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (specifying eight categories of works of authorship); see also
Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 332 (2012) (“Congress recurrently adjusts copyright law to protect
categories of works once outside the law’s compass.”).
264
See Reese supra note 225, at 1513 (describing how Congress can attain judicial and
administrative flexibility in calibrating the subject matter coverage of copyright by defining enumerated
categories in broad, conceptual terms and relying on courts and the Copyright Office to interpret and
apply them).
265
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, § 2.03[A] (noting the ability of courts to recognize
additional types of works beyond those statutorily enumerated).
266
Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 168 (2015)
(describing use of “catalogs” to indicate the scope of a legal super-category through “a specific
enumeration” of illustrative included matter along with an allowance for further inclusions according to
“the family-resemblance principle”). It seems that the legislative history of the 1976 Act reflects a similar
view of the division of labor with respect to categories of copyrightable subject matter and the
constraining role within it of enumerated categories. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976) (“Authors
are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms that
these new expressive methods will take. The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of
copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of communications technology or to allow unlimited
expansion into areas completely outside the present congressional intent. Section 102 implies neither that
that subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of expression within that general area of subject matter
would necessarily be unprotected.”).
267
See supra text accompanying notes 221–23 (describing the Copyright Office’s strict approach);
Reese supra note 225, at 1499 (arguing that a reformed statute “should not extend protection to an openended and undefined category of works”).
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exclusions overlap in their coverage and share a common purpose. There is
subject matter that is functional, fails to meet the minimum threshold of
originality’s creativity aspect, and is also outside § 102(a)’s enumerated or
residual categories of “works of authorship.” But these doctrines have
nonoverlapping portions of their scopes and significant differences in their
means and operational logic. The originality requirement demands case-bycase analysis of whether a particular work exhibits a minimal degree of
creativity in the realm of expressive, communicative forms.268 Section
102(b)’s functionality exclusion screens out works or aspects of works, no
matter how creative, in essence on the ground that their utilitarian nature
renders them inapt for copyright protection.269 Section 102(a) demands that
the courts affirmatively find that subject matter is properly included within
the realm of copyrightable subject matter based on its location within either
a specifically enumerated or a residual category of “works of authorship.”
Section 102(a) thereby serves as a general-purpose filter that allows courts
to deny entry to the realm of copyright for entire subfields of human creation
where, on balance, proprietary rights are likely to do more harm than
good.270 One can make the case that where these filters are partially
redundant in their blocking of copyright’s availability, the relevant subject
matter is triply suspect as a candidate for copyright protection from a socialwelfare perspective. In this sense, the layering of § 102(a) and §102(b)
subject-matter eligibility restrictions on top of a backstopping requirement
of originality exemplifies how partial redundancy in legal design can be a
social good rather than a bane.
D. Reproduction and Derivative-Work Rights
The last example of redundancy in copyright law is a cautionary one,
illustrating how redundancy can go astray. This example relates to the
relationship between the right of reproduction and the right of preparing
derivative works. These are two of a copyright owner’s exclusive
entitlements enumerated in § 106 of the Copyright Act.271 Mainly for
historical reasons, there is substantial overlap between the two. The

268
E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362–64 (1991) (examining a work
for originality and holding that it failed to meet the originality standard).
269
See Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, L.L.C., 803 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir.
2015) (observing that, without § 102(b)’s functionality exclusion, “one might obtain monopoly rights
over [] functional physical sequences by describing them in a tangible medium of expression and labeling
them choreographic works”).
270
See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting
copyright protection of basketball games because such “athletic events” do not fall within a category of
“works of authorship” explicitly listed by § 102(a) and they are “neither similar nor analogous to any of
the listed categories”).
271
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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reproduction right is copyright’s core entitlement of making copies —
fixing the work in a tangible medium of expression.273 The derivative-work
right of § 106(2) confers on the owner a broad exclusive right to make
secondary works based on the original, including, for example, translations,
musical arrangements, dramatizations, motion picture adaptations,
abridgments, and sound recordings.274
Many scholars have argued that the derivative-work right should be
restricted in various ways or even abolished,275 or that a circumscribed
reading of it is consistent with Congress’s intent in recognizing the right
statutorily in 1976.276 Courts, however, have repeatedly read the derivativework right very broadly, pointing to statutory language defining the term
“derivative work” as encompassing any “form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted.”277
Meanwhile, courts have also read the § 106(1) right of reproduction
broadly. In modern copyright law, this right extends well beyond verbatim
reproduction or even verbatim reproduction with minimal changes. It
encompasses any copying that generates a result substantially similar to the
original, where substantial similarity is capaciously understood to include a

272

See id. § 106(1) (creating an exclusive right to reproduce the work “in copies or phonorecords”).
See id. § 101 (defining “copies”).
274
See id. § 106(2) (creating an exclusive right to “prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work”); id. § 101 (defining a “derivative work”).
275
See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the Grey Album, 59
ALA. L. REV. 345, 391 (2008) (asserting four key benefits to abolishing the derivative works right);
Christina Bohannon, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth
and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669, 692–94 (2010) (arguing that the
Copyright Act, including the derivative works right, is overbroad); Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative
Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the Form(Gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work
Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 991, 1020 (2004) (suggesting that the right to
prepare derivate works is “not independent of the other four exclusive rights, but is infringed only in
conjunction with at least one of the other four exclusive rights”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality
in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1215–17 (1996) (asserting that arguments and justifications
supporting “giving an author exclusive rights in derivative works” are unpersuasive and such protection
ceases to generate “significant incentives for creative activity”); Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking
Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1267–68 (1997) (proposing to not consider most
transformative works as derivative works); Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 631
(2008) (arguing that one such approach to solving “some of the problems of tolerated use” is to “suggest
that a product that is a true complement to the original work . . . simply should not be considered an
adaptation of the work under section 106(2)”).
276
See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work
Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505, 1511 (2013) (contending that “the exclusive right to prepare derivative works
is narrower in scope and more bounded than commentators have often feared”).
277
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see Samuelson, supra note 276, at 1509–10 (asserting that the derivative
work right “has been highly problematic in some cases in which courts have interpreted [the right]
broadly”). The most prominent scholarly support for a broad approach to the derivative-work right
appears in the treatise by Paul Goldstein, 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.0 (3d ed.
2011).
273

298

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:2
278

wide—although not unlimited—range of similarities.
The broad scope accorded to each of the two rights is the source of their
overlap. Is a sequel for a novel that uses many of its characters and some of
its plot lines a copy, a derivative work, or perhaps both? The usual answer
by courts is that the specific classification as a copy or a derivative work
does not matter.279 The violation of either right is subject to the same
infringement test, defenses, and remedies.280 Generally speaking, therefore,
there seems little need to try to define a clear dividing line between the two
rights and thus to require the wasting of energy classifying individual cases
of infringement as falling on one or the other side of the line.
Indeed, some have pushed this logic further, arguing that in light of the
reproduction right and other § 106 entitlements, the derivative-work right is
“completely superfluous.”281 It is generally recognized, however, that
various doctrinal technicalities turn on the issue of a work classified as a
reproduction or a derivative work.282 Sometimes the cause is a statutory
distinction. Various rights of authors to terminate copyright transfers under
§ 203(a)283 and § 304(c)–(d),284 for example, are subject to limitation based
on the reliance interests of those who made authorized derivative works prior
to the termination.285 Such users enjoy a privilege to continue exploiting
these derivative works notwithstanding the termination.286 A related
privilege to exploit prior non-infringing derivative works exists under
278

Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 782 (2009)
(describing the substantial similarity test for copyright infringement as “notoriously capacious”).
279
Usually this assumption is not even made explicitly but rather is implied in a casual and
indifferent approach by courts to the question of the reproduction/derivative-work borderline. A
representative example of this casual approach is Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc.,
150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). In this case the court held that a trivia game that derived its questions and
answers from the details of a television program infringed on the television program’s copyrights. Id. at
138–39. The plaintiff’s argument was that the game was a derivative work, but the court’s opinion
demonstrates a conspicuous indifference to the question of which entitlement is infringed and even refers
repeatedly to the game as a work that “copies” the program. Id. at 138–41.
280
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(2) (2012) (presenting the reproduction and derivative-work rights as
coordinate rights of a copyright owner).
281
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, § 8.09[A][1] (presenting the argument that the
derivative-work right is superfluous but then noting “some exotic situations in which the adaptation right
may take on substantive significance”).
282
Compare id. § 3.04 (addressing the scope of protections for derivative work), with id. § 8.02
(addressing the same for reproductions).
283
17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012) (providing a right to terminate a transfer or license under specified
conditions, including the lapse of thirty-five to forty years since the transfer or license).
284
Id. § 304(c)–(d) (2012) (providing right to terminate certain transfers or licenses of renewal
copyright for certain works).
285
See, e.g., Stephen McJohn, The Case of the Missing Case: Stewart v. Abend and Fair Use, 53
IDEA 323, 347 (2013) (noting that § 203’s “termination provisions . . . allow continued use of derivative
works prepared under the terms of the grant (in other words, in reliance on the grant)”).
286
See id. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A) (providing conditions for continued use of a derivative work
after termination of a transfer or license); cf. id. § 304(a)(4)(A) (providing conditions for continued use
of a derivative work under a class of situations involving a renewed or extended copyright term).
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§ 104A, which restores copyright protection to foreign works that fell into
the public domain due to non-compliance with formality requirements under
former U.S. law.288 In both of these cases, the privilege applies only to
derivative works and not to reproductions.
In other cases, the need to distinguish between a reproduction and a
derivative work arises from a more fundamental feature of the copyright
owner’s rights. For example, consider a case where I purchase a lawful copy
of Rembrandt’s The Night Watch, hypothetically under copyright, and I add
little green alien figures in the background. I did not reproduce the original
work because I did not create a copy: I did not generate a new tangible
fixation of the original. But as long as what I created is a derivative work, I
potentially infringed the derivative-work right, which does not require the
making of a copy.289 In such cases, it becomes important to recognize the
partial independent coverage of the right. Courts often struggle both in
defining the copyright owners’ separate rights and in classifying arguably
infringing activities accordingly.290 Arguably, however, these cases are
sufficiently manageable and containable to justify the otherwise careless
approach to the only partially overlapping nature of reproduction and
derivative-work rights.
Another set of cases is more worrisome. Here the careless and
undisciplined approach to the overlap between reproduction and derivativework rights has brought about confused and even absurd results—alarmingly
detached from background policies. Consider the case of Warner Bros.
Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books.291 In this case, Steven Vander Ark, a fan
of the Harry Potter novels by J.K. Rowling, developed and operated a
website that functioned as a lexicon on all things Harry Potter—your go-to
287
Id. § 104A(d)(3) (allowing for continued use of certain derivative works “if the reliance party
pays to the owner of the restored copyright reasonable compensation” for otherwise infringing conduct).
288
See id. § 104A(a)(1)(A) (providing for copyright in “restored works”).
289
See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that “§ 106(2) creates a
separate exclusive right” distinct from both the rights of reproduction and of distribution of copies). A
related but distinct issue is whether a derivative work has to be fixed at all in order to infringe, as in the
case of an unfixed live performance derivative of a copyrighted play. Compare Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing that “[a] derivative work must be
fixed to be protected under the Act, . . . but not to infringe” (citation omitted)), with PATRY, supra note
52, § 12:14 (arguing that copyright “may be infringed by an unauthorized unfixed derivative work”),
with NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 103, §8.09 [A][2] (explaining that the court’s pronouncement in
Galoob that an infringing derivative work may be unfixed is dictum and arguing that “fixation should be
required to infringe the adaptation right”).
290
See A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d at 581 (determining whether reprinting an artist’s work on tiles counts
as a derivative work); Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir.
1988) (reasoning that art reproduction is not necessary for finding a derivative work ); Peter Lettersee &
Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2008)
(determining whether the use of checklists and drills from a religious book in a course is a derivative
work of the original book).
291
575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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place if you experience a burning urge to read, for example, an encyclopedia
of spells and potions.292 For years after the creation of this website, Vander
Ark received praise and even special treatment from J.K. Rowling and other
stakeholders in the Harry Potter empire until he agreed to publish the
Lexicon in print through defendant RDR Books.293 Vander Ark had
previously worried about publishing the Lexicon in print, particularly after
Rowling had indicated her own interest in writing a Harry Potter
encyclopedia, but RDR Books had reassured him that the print publication
would be legal and agreed to “defend and indemnify [him] in the event of
any lawsuits.”294 Within a couple months of Vander Ark’s publishing
agreement with RDR Books, the copyright holders filed suit.295
Sensibly, the district court found that the Lexicon was not a derivative
of the Harry Potter copyrighted work.296 The court reasoned that not every
work inspired by another, or based on another in some loose sense, is a
derivative in the copyright sense.297 More specifically, the court concluded
the Lexicon—a collection of alphabetically organized entries about all
characters, places, creatures, spells, and potions in the Harry Potter
universe—was too different from the work of fiction known as Harry Potter
to be considered a transformed or adapted version of it.298 In the court’s
terms, the Lexicon was so transformative that it “no longer ‘represent[ed]
[the] original work[s] of authorship’” and thus did not infringe the
derivative-work right.299 This analysis seems plausible. In the very same
opinion, however, the court held the Lexicon to be a copy of Harry Potter
and therefore in violation of the reproduction right.300
This is, of course, a perverse outcome. It could be reached only by
reasoning that had become unmoored from the basic purpose of the doctrine
in this area. Defending a conclusion that a particular use is not a derivative
work but is an infringing reproduction requires some conceptualization of
each of the rights and the relationship between them.301 But the primary
conceptualization that comes to mind points in the opposite direction from
292

Id. at 520.
See id. at 521–22 (describing “positive feedback, including from Rowling and her publishers”
before Vander Ark agreed to publish the Lexicon).
294
Id. at 522.
295
Id. at 524.
296
Id. at 539.
297
Id. at 538.
298
Id. at 520, 539.
299
Id. at 539 (alteration in original).
300
Id. at 534–38; see Samuelson, supra note 276, at 1541–42 (praising the court’s conclusion that
the Lexicon was too different to be a derivative of the Harry Potter books). But any basis for praise here
is severely, if not entirely, undercut by the court’s accompanying finding that the Lexicon was an
infringing reproduction.
301
Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better than
Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785, 800–01 (2013).
293
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the court’s logic and conclusion.
An attractive candidate for explaining the relationship between the
reproduction and derivative-work right is as follows. The two rights occupy
different but partly overlapping spaces on a continuum of similarity to
expressive elements of the original work.302 For simplicity, this continuum
is represented as extending along a single horizontal direction in Figure 1
below, with the distinct scopes of the reproduction and derivative-work right
indicated by overlapping triangles. In reality, however, the continuum of
similarity extends along multiple dimensions reflecting medium of
expression as well as content. As one commentator puts it, a derivative work
lies in the “gray zone” on “the continuum between an exact reproduction of
protected property[] and the creation of an original work.”303 A duplication
of the text of a copyrighted novel with only minor changes to certain phrases
is reproduction, but its extreme closeness to the original probably precludes
it from being a derivative work. 304 A motion picture that serves as a prequel
to the story told in a copyrighted novel and therefore uses some of its
characters and incorporates several of its other expressive elements is not a
reproduction, but it may be a derivative work.305 An annotated selection of
a few of the novel’s chapters may be both a reproduction and a derivative
work.306

302

Cf. id. at 807 (observing that “[t]he distinction between derivation and (other forms of)
reproduction is that a nonderivative form of copying takes the expression of the primary work, while a
derivation may take but it must also transfer and transform what makes the primary work original”
(emphasis in original)); id. at 845 (showing a diagram presenting reproduction and derivative work as
occupying different parts of a continuum of concrete expression taken from a primary work).
303
Timothy Everett Nielander, The Mighty Morphin Ninja Mallard: The Standard for Analysis of
Derivative Work Infringement in the Digital Age, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 2 (1997). The term “an
original work” does not refer here to meeting copyright’s originality threshold, but to a work that is too
different to be a derivative of another work from which it borrows. No doubt, a work may be a derivative
work and satisfy the originality requirement.
304
See Gervais, supra note 301, at 788, 801–02 (explaining that the definition of a derivative work
is not clear and that, although statutes provide examples of named derivatives, they do not provide an
exhaustive list).
305
See id. (explaining how a “derivative work transforms or recasts something protectable in the
primary work . . . by adding or transforming it”).
306
See id. (providing examples of derivative works and that “some additional work by the derivative
user” is necessary).
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Figure 1: Conceptualization of Overlap Between the Reproduction and
Derivative-Work Right Along a Horizontal Axis of Similarity to the Original
The point of this conceptualization is not to draw a crisp line between
the two categories, but instead to convey in a disciplined and coherent way
the relationship between them as it relates to underlying policy. As the level
of similarity between elements derived from a copyrighted work becomes
increasingly remote from verbatim reproduction, the ratio of the social value
added by copyright coverage of those elements and the social cost of such
coverage can be expected to drop. This is so because, generally speaking,
control of remote-similarity uses can be expected to be less significant for
ensuring a robust level of incentives for primary authors, but can be expected
to impose undiminishing or even increasing social costs through taxation or
discouragement of secondary uses that likely incorporate original content,
perhaps even more so as the distance from the primary work increases.307 As
the value-to-cost ratio of copyright coverage drops, so does the justification
for the extension of exclusive rights.308 This is all the more true from the
point of view of normative outlooks that favor a robust freedom for
secondary uses and creative re-appropriation beyond what is dictated by the

307

See Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and
Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 207 (2006) (building on an “intuition that there are
diminishing returns to increasing the scope of copyright”); cf. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the
Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1707–08 (1988) (providing “speculative accounts of how
determination of the incentive/loss ratio might proceed” in various situations).
308
Cf. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813,
1829–30 (1984) (describing a way of assessing the relative desirability of different legal policies by
examining “the ratio between the reward the patentee receives when permitted to use a particular
restrictive practice and the monopoly loss that results from such exploitation of the patent”).
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strict calculus of economic efficiency.
There is a lively debate about whether the current, broad derivativework right can be justified under any normative framework, with most
commentators answering in the negative.310 It is quite possible that the
preferable alternative is an overall reduced scope of copyright achieved by
eliminating or shrinking the derivative-work right and also obviating any
backdoor derivative-work right by more tightly circumscribing the
reproduction right. For our purposes, it is enough to point out that, at least if
derivative-work right or its analog is not entirely eliminated, a proper
understanding of the relationship between the reproduction and derivativework right has important implications. In accordance with the
conceptualization proffered here, a derivative-work right—and in particular
that portion of such a right covering secondary uses sufficiently different
from the original that they cannot be plausibly seen as reproduction—rests
on a weaker and more precarious justification than the core of copyright’s
reproduction right.311 It follows that as we advance on the continuum of
similarity from the exclusive area of reproduction to the zone overlapping
with derivative works, and then to that associated exclusively with derivative
works, the justification for copyright thins. Once we proceed along this
continuum to uses that do not incorporate enough of the expressive material
of the original to count even as a derivative work, the justification for
copyright protection runs out altogether.
Implications of this conceptual picture are twofold. First, perverse logic
such as that of the RDR Books decision should be avoided. If a court decides
that a secondary work does not incorporate enough of a primary work’s
authorship to count as a derivative, it should not find that the secondary work
is a reproduction. What is too different to be a derivative work is a fortiori
too different to be a reproduction. Second, as we proceed along the
continuum of similarity away from exact reproduction, courts generally
should be cognizant of the corresponding weakening justification for
copyright protection and therefore warier of imposing liability or heavy
copyright remedies, even when an allegedly infringing work is found to be
a reproduction or derivative. Practically this means that as they enter the
derivative-work zone, and particularly its outer parameter, courts should
apply other constraining doctrines, such as fair use, scènes à faire, and the
idea-expression dichotomy with greater care and frequency to prevent
309
Bracha & Syed, supra note 195, at 269–74 (explaining how self-determination theory provides
stronger support than efficiency for a robust freedom to create works that creatively re-appropriate
material from preexisting works).
310
See supra notes 275–60 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of a derivative work
and right, the relation of a derivative work to an original, and the benefits of eliminating the derivativework right).
311
See Bambauer, supra note 275, at 391 (stating that the derivative-work right is weak and should
be abolished).
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copyright law from overreaching its social purpose.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the difficulty with the reproduction
and derivative-work right interface is not the partial overlap as such.
Redundancy does not by itself cause perversity such as that seen in RDR
Books. Difficulty can arise, however, from a failure to ground decisionmaking in a coherent and, from a policy perspective, plausible
conceptualization of the relationship between overlapping doctrines. Once
overlapping doctrines are unmoored from their underlying purposes and left
to float as formal shells, all sorts of strange and undesirable outcomes can
follow. The trouble, in other words, is not redundancy per se, but redundancy
whose structure is not well-designed or implemented in light of the
substantive policies of the relevant legal field.
CONCLUSION
As a principle of design for legal doctrine, redundancy can help the law
secure core interests, allow for case-by-case flexibility and long-term
evolution, and do so in ways that—relative to alternatives—save on legal
drafting and administration costs. But of course, redundancy can be poorly
implemented or overdone, a fact that at least partly explains the common
rhetorical dominance of anti-redundancy principles. Greater appreciation of
the potential positive and negative aspects of redundancy in the context of
underlying policies can helpfully inform evaluation of the complex array of
legal doctrines that regulate copyrightability and liability for copyright
infringement. Further, better attention to the subtleties of redundancy,
including the various potential forms of partial redundancy, can help ensure
that redundancy does not go awry.
Our examples of doctrinal redundancy in copyright law help illustrate
these general principles, as well as additional aspects of how redundancy
can and does operate in practice. Three of these examples illustrate potential
rationales for keeping redundant limitations on copyright protection. But we
should emphasize that redundancy can also work in tandem with robust
copyright protection, as it has historically through the emergence of
derivative-works rights on top of expansive reproduction rights.313 A fuller
discussion of the main takeaways from our copyright examples follows.
312
See Gervais, supra note 301, at 809–10 (stating courts need to evaluate additional factors and
that the “idea-expression dichotomy and . . . the scènes à faire doctrine[] are other good candidates for a
differential application to derivative uses”); Samuelson, supra note 276, at 1554–58 (discussing cases
that distinguish derivative works from infringement).
313
See supra text accompanying notes 260–63 (explaining that the derivative-work right and the
right of reproduction overlap but there are cases in which it is necessary to distinguish between the two).
This case of pro-copyright redundancy does provide us with an example of how redundancy can go
wrong, but, in our account here, that example is fundamentally one of misapplication following from
inattention to underlying purpose, not an example of the inadvisability of such pro-copyright redundancy
per se. See supra text accompanying notes 276–81.
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The partial redundancy between copyright’s fair use doctrine and
§ 102(b)’s exclusion of functional subject matter illustrates a form of rulestandard redundancy in which a more rule-like doctrine—here, exclusion of
functional subject matter from copyrightability—at least partly overlays a
more general, jack-of-all-trades standard—here, the exemption of fair uses
from copyright liability.314 Although the question of what is considered
functional for copyright purposes can at times seem standard-like,
particularly when applying doctrines such as the merger doctrine,315 the
determination of functionality has a relatively narrow focus in comparison
to the relatively totality-of-circumstances nature of fair use analysis.
Consequently, § 102(b)’s requirement of nonfunctionality can channel
certain functional material away from copyright protection more readily and
predictably than would be likely under even a very robust version of the fair
use exemption alone.316 Further, part of the reason that the nonfunctionality
requirement can achieve this is procedural and institutional: the less
factually intensive nature of standard functionality inquiries makes them
better tools for decisive action by trial judges in response to motions for early
dismissal or summary judgment.317
At the same time, retaining a robust fair use backstop can also add
substantial value, particularly at copyright’s “frontier,” where courts are
seeking to apply old nonfunctionality doctrines in new technological and
business environments. In such areas, courts might not always apply the
nonfunctionality requirement properly. The courts’ struggles with respect to
questions of interoperability in the Oracle case and its analogs illustrate this
point.318 In other situations, entrenched doctrinal features may frustrate
reaching desirable results under new and unpredicted technological or
economic circumstances, as in the Sega case.319 In both of these sets of
circumstances in which courts are especially error-prone, there seems to be
good reason to deploy a strong backstopping principle, such as the opentextured doctrine of fair use. The combination of a rule-like overlay and a
flexible backstopping standard can thereby enable society to substantially
enjoy the advantages of a rule-like norm in a plurality of core cases while
also retaining a safety net to prevent frustration of underlying policies
314

See supra text accompanying notes 129–36 (discussing the Sega case).
See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 427–28 (“Courts in numerous merger cases have taken into
account whether the alternative expressions were inferior in some way, such as because they were less
efficient, impractical, unreasonable, illogical, or contrary to industry expectations.” (footnotes omitted)).
316
See supra text accompanying notes 107–09 (explaining that outcomes under the fair use doctrine
are hard to predict because of its complex inquiry, as compared to outcomes under § 102(b), which it is
more straightforward).
317
See supra text accompanying notes 109–11 (discussing procedural considerations relating to the
nonfunctionality requirement).
318
See supra text accompanying notes 81–84 (discussing how the court in the Oracle case handled
the question of interoperability).
319
See supra text accompanying notes 129–36 (discussing the Sega case).
315
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through changed circumstances or conscious circumvention.
Of course, under certain circumstances, a rule-plus-standard
combination could lead to society predominantly suffering from the
disadvantages of both a rule and a standard. But this unhappy result can be
rendered less likely by applying two design principles. First, the reinforcing
aspects of the rule and standard should be such that they help prevent errors
in a direction that is especially disfavored—for example, because of
background presumptions in favor of free competition or speech.320 Second,
to the extent there is substantial cause for concern about, say, the
unpredictability of the standard with respect to reasonably well-established
forms of activity, the standard might be confined to a relatively secondary
role, predominantly involving extreme or novel circumstances.321
Copyright’s doctrines of fair use and improper appropriation exemplify
a different form of redundant structure: one involving two standards having
overlapping concerns, but fundamentally involving distinctly structured
inquiries.322 Although improper appropriation doctrine’s substantial
similarity inquiry is about as standard-like as one can imagine, this inquiry
does focus sharply on a comparison of the expressive content of two
works—a comparison that tends to form only one aspect of the fair use
doctrine’s more totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry.323 Here, the more
limited focus of the improper appropriation standard can, for a certain class
of situations, render its relation to fair use effectively like that of a rule laid
over a more general, backstopping standard. In situations where lack of
substantial similarity may be properly found based on a streamlined set of
readily accessible and perhaps even relatively undisputed facts, the improper
appropriation doctrine can enable disposition of a case more quickly,
cheaply, and predictably than a fair use inquiry.
As noted earlier, the nonfunctionality doctrine can similarly enable such
quicker, cheaper, and predictable dispositions in a distinct subset of cases.
In both cases—that of the improper appropriation doctrine and that of the
nonfunctionality doctrine—these advantages extend beyond mere
improvements in the administrability of legal processes. In the copyright
context, easier and more predictable processes for solving disputes and
dismissing meritless claims promotes underlying substantive policies by
320

See supra text accompanying note 206 (suggesting that the overlap between fair use doctrine
and the requirement of improper appropriation is one way to obtain more desirable results); Golden,
supra note 6, at 707 (“[W]here law is focused on one dominant interest and we are confident that we will
want the law to retain this focus over time, redundancy [to protect that interest] might well be a good
social strategy.”).
321
See Golden, supra note 6, at 709 (discussing “contract law’s unconscionability doctrine”).
322
See supra text accompanying notes 154–74 (comparing the doctrines of fair use and improper
appropriation and illustrating their similarities and differences in the context of Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983)).
323
See supra text accompanying notes 157–56 (describing the improper appropriation doctrine as
having a “narrow focus” and the fair use doctrine as being “multi-focal”).
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helping prevent undue chilling of speech liable to attract accusations of
copyright infringement. Process improvements thus make it more likely that
relevant parties will actively enjoy the use privileges given to them.
Once again, however, there is a potential counterbalancing concern. The
layering of different legal hurdles to copyright liability can generate more
false negatives in the form of socially undesirable determinations of no
liability, even as the layering decreases false positives in the form of socially
undesirable determinations of liability. At least to some degree, this concern
might be viewed as sharper in the case of layered standards than in the case
of a rule overlaid on a standard because the layered-standard structure might
provide two broad bases for uncertainty without the sort of “safe harbor” or
“sure shipwreck” predictability possible within the core region encompassed
by a rule.324 Within the context of copyright, however, we think the critical
value attached to background free speech interests can justify a layering of
bulwarks for those interests, despite associated costs.325 Indeed, the core
nature of the free speech interest in democratic society may demand such an
arrangement. In this context, well-designed redundancy is a doctrinal
strategy for safeguarding “higher-order” interests even at some possible
detriment to other interests or goals.
Copyrightability requirements of originality, nonfunctionality, and
qualification as a work of authorship illustrate a third form of doctrinal
structure: one of multiple overlapping filters, each imperfect, that through
collective action serve a shared purpose of providing proper boundaries for
the scope of a legal field. In a significant sense, the originality, work-ofauthorship, and nonfunctionality requirements break the question of
copyrightability down into separately identifiable, but not wholly distinct
parts, each with a different focus and structure for inquiry.
The work-of-authorship and nonfunctionality requirements both operate
as relatively coarse-grained filters, tending to function at the level of types
appropriate or inappropriate for copyright protection.326 The exclusion of
functional subject matter in § 102(b) tends to have a unidimensional function
and focus: channeling a specific kind of subject matter for which the features
of copyright seem a poor fit away from this regime and in the direction of
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See Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1385, 1387–88
(2016) (describing standards as “provid[ing] general considerations . . . [that] leave the determination of
legal results to future decision makers,” while describing the ability of “safe harbor[s]” and “sure
shipwreck[s]” to guarantee that particular facts will result in particular legal outcomes).
325
See supra text accompanying notes 200-11 (discussing how the doctrinal layering of the fair use
and improper appropriation doctrines helps protect free speech interests).
326
See supra text accompanying notes 231–34, 237–41 (discussing the role of § 102(a) and (b) in
determining what material should receive protection and underscoring the social utility of effective
tailoring of copyright law’s coverage).
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327

other better-suited forms of legal protection. The criterion of the § 102(a)
filter is broader and more open-ended: under the banner of “work of
authorship,”328 § 102(a) requires a work to be of a general category or type
of works for which copyright protection is appropriate.329 More detailed
delimitation of the range of categorical inclusion is not left completely to
courts, however. Instead, the section embodies an institutional division of
labor.330 Section 102(a) lists subcategories with respect to which Congress
explicitly pronounced judgments of copyright eligibility. But § 102(a)
leaves courts to make judgments on whether other classes of works, such as
sports moves, are appropriate for copyright, either by interpreting broadly
the enumerated subcategories or by characterizing additional subject matter
as falling within the residual category of “works of authorship.”331 In
contrast, the originality requirement is a fine-grained, albeit weak filter. It
calls for granular, case-by-case scrutiny of whether a particular work has
enough of the quality of creativity deemed to be distinctively necessary for
copyrightable subject matter—i.e. communicative, expressive forms.332
The redundant doctrinal structure generated by these overlapping
requirements helps circumvent the difficulty of formulating a single,
reasonably administrable test for answering the question of what sorts of
creations merit copyright protection. In this sense, the partially redundant
copyrightability doctrines operate in a manner analogous to separate, twodimensional maps that feature different focal points on a globe or different
methodologies for projecting portions of the globe onto a two-dimensional
surface. Together, these maps can provide a more readily usable and reliable
method of envisioning the whole than any single, two-dimensional map—
even one that comes with descriptions of its distortions and rules for
stitching together its ends.
Finally, through the example of reproduction and derivative-work
rights, we acknowledge that redundancy can sometimes go wrong,
especially when decision-makers lose sight of the underlying purposes of
relevant legal doctrines and their intended relationship. Even only partial
redundancy can lead to sloppiness in distinguishing the proper character of
overlapping doctrines, and at least occasionally, such sloppiness can produce
327
See supra text accompanying notes 232–34 (discussing the role of § 102(b) in filtering subjectmatter better-suited for protection under patent law than copyright law).
328
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
329
See supra text accompanying notes 255–60 (explaining why copyright protection and
proprietary rights in general may not be appropriate for certain types of subject matter).
330
See supra text accompanying notes 262–50 (explaining the “division of labor” between Congress
and the courts).
331
See supra text accompanying note 265 (discussing the work that § 102(a) of the Copyright Act
leaves to courts).
332
See supra text accompanying notes 251–54 (explaining the practical application of the
originality requirement as well as its justifications).
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confusion and a peculiarly perverse legal conclusion, such as we believe was
the case in RDR Books.333 The point is independent of any view on the proper
scope of copyright: even if one favors a broad scope that makes a wide range
of derivative uses subject to copyright, derivative-work and reproduction
rights should be understood in a way that is coherent in light of the policies
supposedly served by each set of rights. To the extent redundancy leads to
confusion, it can lead to muddled law and bad results.
But the example of RDR Books also illustrates how redundancy failure
is not necessarily intrinsic to redundancy itself. Instead, a failure of
redundancy to add net value rather than subtract it can reflect a failure by
relevant decision-makers to pay attention to how redundant parts are meant
to act and interact in concert. Of course, this means that deployment of
partially redundant legal doctrines comes with information costs for actors
who need to apply the law or predict its application. But this seems true
whenever the law deploys a multiplicity of legal doctrines. Thus,
information costs about the relationship and purposes of legal doctrines do
not seem a special reason for rejecting redundancy wholesale, even if they
might limit the number of legal doctrines that can be effectively deployed
within any particular field.
In sum, copyright law and principles of redundancy and anti-redundancy
each have something to teach the other. When analyzed in light of
redundancy theory, various doctrinal features of copyright that might
initially appear confused or wasteful, such as overlapping aspects of
doctrines of copyrightability and fair use, turn out to embody apparently
useful, functional design. Other overlapping doctrinal features, such as the
provisions for reproduction and derivative-work rights, can lead to muddled
analysis and questionable results consistent with pessimistic expectations of
anti-redundancy theory.
Copyright law, for its part, enriches the study of redundancy in legal
design. Copyright law exemplifies how redundancy in legal doctrine can
advance substantial social ends by helping prevent undesirable case
outcomes, by facilitating more expeditious dispute resolution, and by
allowing individually administrable legal doctrines to together approximate
a more complex whole. Distinct but overlapping doctrines of fair use,
improper appropriation, originality, and copyrightable subject matter are
likely to better police the boundaries of an expansive copyright regime than
would a significantly more streamlined set of fully compartmentalized legal
doctrines. In contrast, confusion with respect to the relationship between
reproduction and derivative-work rights indicates how optimal operation of
legal redundancy can entail information and administration costs, including
those associated with continued attention to the underlying purposes of legal
333

See supra text accompanying notes 271–81 (explaining the court’s reasoning in Warner Bros.
Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), and questioning the reasonableness
of the outcome).
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doctrines.
This Article has shown how redundancy can be a crucial strategy for
protecting key social interests such as free speech interests. Like all
strategies, however, redundancy is vulnerable to slipshod execution. With
this caveat, legal policymakers might generally do well to incorporate
redundancy as a basic, albeit not always controlling, principle for
formulating and evaluating legal design.

